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1.
INTRODUCTION
Many corporations operate in countries with poor human rights records and
at times are accused of being complicit in the violations carried out by the
governments of these states. Intemational bodies have been working on
guidelines to define the responsibilities of corporations in order to avoid such
complicity. ' During his mandate as Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and fransnational corporations and other
business enterprises. Professor John Ruggie developed a human rights
framework and due diligence standards to determine the responsibilities of
corporations.^ While these developments demonstrate concern for the dangers of
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Bohoslavsky, Geoff Gilbert, Jim Gobert, Karen Hulme, Jeff King, Sheldon Leader and Nigel Rodley
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1. See, e.g.. Organization for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. [OECD], OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises (2008); U.N. Global Compact, The Ten Principles, available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html; Draft Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corp. and Other Bus. Enters, with Regard to Human Rights,
Comm'n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12 (2003). See also Int'l Comm'n of
Jurists, Report of the Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes, Vol. 3:
Civil Remedies (2008), available at
http://www.icj.org/default.asp?nodelD=349&sesslD=&langage=l&myPage=Legal_Documentation
&id=2285l.
2. U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corp. and Other Bus. Enters., Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, Human Rights
Council, A'HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie). The guiding principles were adopted by
the UN Human Rights Council in June 2011. See also Press Release, U.N. Human Rights Council,
New Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights Endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council
(June 16, 2011) available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/n1ggic/n4ggie-
guiding-principles-endorsed-16-jun-2011 .pdf
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corporate complicity, these guidelines do not give rise to legally enforceable
obligations.
.In an attempt to achieve legal accountability, concemed parties and
organizations are increasingly suing corporations for their role in human rights
violations committed by regimes.^ The main difficulty for courts in deciding
complicity liability is where to draw the line between acceptable business
interactions with regimes that clearly commit gross human rights violations, and
activities that make the corporation complicit in these violations. As is, it is
difficult to answer these questions with regard to corporate activities. But the
issue becomes even more complicated in the context of liabüity for doing
business with, and thus making funds available to, regimes that carry out gross
human rights violations. Unlike commodities such as weapons, money is never
the direct means by which gross human rights violations are perpetrated.
Moreover, money is difficult to connect to a particular human rights violation
because of its fungibility. For example, it is easier to link a specific weapon or
even weapons sold by a particular manufacturer to an exfrajudicial killing,
whereas it would be difficult to link any particular loan to the same killing. Does
this ftingibility mean that money is always too removed for complicity liability?
If not, how can a sufficiently close link between a loan and a gross human rights
violation be established to avoid holding lenders responsible for every violation
a borrowing regime carries out?
The expanding corporate complicity debate has largely excluded the
question of responsibility for financial complicity.^ Instead, to the extent that
loans to regimes that committed gross human rights violations are in the legal
and political spotlight, the discussion has centered primarily on the legality or
legitimacy of the resulting debt.^ Although the legal validity of loans and
complicity liability undoubtedly share factual issues, the two legal issues hold
very different consequences. To the extent that funding gross human rights
violations voids a loan, the consequence of a violation would be to relieve the
3. Litigation under the Alien Torts Act is increasing in US Courts. See, e.g.. In re "Agent
Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Presbyterian Church of
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Pefroleum Co., No. 96 CIV. 8386 (KMW), 2002 WL 319887 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002); Doe v.
Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
4. Some notable exceptions are Anita Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies? Swiss Banks and
Intemational Human Rights, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 325 (1998); Shaw W. Scott, Note, Taking
Riggs Seriously: The ATCA Case Against a Corporate Abettor of Pinochet Atrocities, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 1497 (2005); Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Veerle Opgenhaffen, The Past and Present of
Corporate Complicity: Financing the Argentinean Dictatorship, 23 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 157 (2010);
Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Mariana Rulli, Corporate Complicity and Finance as a 'Killing Agent ', 8
J. INT. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 829 (2010).
5. SABINE MICHALOWSKI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL REGIMES AND THE VALIDITY OF SOVEREIGN
DEBT: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 69-96, (2007); Sabine Michalowski & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, ¡us
Cogens, Transitional Justice and Other Trends of the Debate on Odious Debts: A Response to the
World Bank Discussion Paper on Odious Debts, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 59 (2009).
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debtor state fiom it.3 repayment obligation. If the same loan gave rise to
complicity liability, the corporation could be found liable to the victims of these
violations and provide them with a remedy. Victims of gross human rights
violations may therefore be without a remedy unless the discussion extends
beyond debt repayment and into the context of corporate complicity.^
The question of corporate complicity liabilify in gross human rights
violations has arisen mainly in litigation before US courts under the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA). Recent US case law defines the mens rea standard of such
liabilify, and debates the existence of corporate complicity liabilify under the
ATCA.^ However, the decision in South African Apartheid Litigation^
demonstrates that in the context of financing, there is a need for in-depth
analysis of the actus reus and causation elements of complicity liabilify. In that
case, the Court dismissed aiding and abetting claims against banking defendants
for their complicity in the human rights violations committed by the South
African apartheid. It based its decision on the grounds that commercial loans are
too far removed from human rights violations carried out by their recipients for
a legally relevant link to exist between the two.'^ This holding creates a
sweeping exemption for commercial lenders from complicify liability, without
the requirement of a case-by-case analysis or an examination of the lender's
mens rea.
Other courts adjudicating under the ATCA have since adopted the
reasoning in South African Apartheid Litigation.^^ Given the scarcity of legal
analysis and authorify on the problem of complicity for financing gross human
6. Sabine Michalowski, Trazando Paralelos entre la Responsabilidad de Bancos por
Complicidad y las Deudas Odiosas, REVISTA JURÍDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PALERMO, Aug.
2009, at 279, 286-87.
7. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, hic, 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir.
2009) (suggesting a move ñ-om a mens rea standard of knowledge to one of primary purpose, which
would considerably reduce the possibility of successful litigation against corporations); But see Doe
V. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that Talisman was wrongly decided
and that the mens rea standard in intemational law is that of knowledge).
8. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cirf 2010); Doe v. Nestle,
S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1088-91 (CD. Cal. 2010) (rejecting the existence of such liability), ln
favour of such liability, .see Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d II; Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643
F. 2d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, Nos. 02-56256,02-56390,09-56381, 2011 WL
5041927 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2011); Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149-188 (Levai, J., concurring only in the
judgment). For further discussion, see Volker Nerlich, Core Crimes and Intemational Business
Corporations, 8 JICJ 895 (2010); Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the
Alien Tort Statute: a Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. lNT'L L. 353 (2011); Michael
Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights Litigation, 50 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 271 (2009); Lucien J. Dhooge, Accessorial Liability of Transnational Corporations Pursuant to
the Alien Tort Statute: The South African Apartheid Litigation and the Lessons of Central Bank, 18
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 247,280-81 (2009).
9. In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
10. W. at 269.
11. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1096.
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rights violations committed by regimes, it is likely that these arguments will
prove influential far beyond litigation against banks under the ATCA. South
African Apartheid Litigation is thus significant not only for future complicify
cases under the ATCA, but also for advancing the debate on lender liability for
complicity in gross human rights violations more generally.
This Article provides a detailed critique of the arguments that led the Court
to exempt commercial lenders from complicity liability. This includes a critical
analysis of the Court's interpretation of the Ministries case {Accord United
States V. Von Weizsacker)^^ as an indication that Nuremberg case law declines
all liability with regard to commercial loans. Courts tend to rely on Nuremberg
cases as the main, if not the sole authorify, that supports their rejection of
complicify liabilify for commercial loans.'^ However, the relevant Nuremberg
cases, as well as developments in intemational law, do not justify such a far-
reaching conclusion, making a strong case for reconsidering complicify liability
of lenders in gross human rights violations.
This Article contrasts the view of the Court in South African Apartheid
Litigation that money is inherently neufral and loans are always too far removed
from the violations carried out by their recipients with US case law on funding
terrorism, which adopts the opposite view by regarding money as particularly
dangerous and casts a wide net for complicify liabilify. Finally, this Article
discusses whether the policy considerations and liabilify standards applied in the
terrorism context are transferrable to complicity liability for funding regimes
that commit gross human rights violations.
II.
SOUTH AFRICAN APARTHEID LITIGATION
A. Litigation for Corporate Complicity under the ATCA
Victims of the apartheid regime filed a lawsuit in the United States under
the ATCA, which provides that "[t]he disfrict courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violadon
of the law of nations or a freafy of the United States."''' It was enacted as part of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 to deal with cases such as piracy.'^ For about 200
years, the statute lay forgotten until it was rediscovered by human rights lav^ fyers
and tested in Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, where the Court determined that the ATCA
12. United States v. Von Weizsäcker ("The Ministries Case"), 14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 [T.W.C.],
at 478 (Nuemberg Military Tribs. 1950).
13. The most important examples are Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254,
293 (2d Cir. 2007); In re South African Apartheid, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 258-59; Nestle, 748 F. Supp.
2d at 1088-91, 1094-97, 1099-1100.
14. Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
15. Sosa V. Alvarez-Maehain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
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allowed victims to sue in US courts for serious violations of intemational human
rights law.'^ A string of lawsuits for gross human rights violations followed
Filártiga, not only against individuals, but also against multinational
corporations. ' ^
The main litigation issues for corporate complicity under the ATCA are: (i)
how to define what falls under the law of nations; ' ^  (ii) whether cases can be
brought against corporations;" (iii) whether the ATCA encompasses liability
for aiding and abetting;^^ and (iv) if so, what standards courts should apply to
determine the actus reus and mens rea of such liability.
B. Corporate Complicity in the South African Context and the Khulumani
Complaint
When Nelson Mandela became the first black president of South Africa in
1994, the government established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC) to investigate and document human rights violations committed under
apartheid between March 1960 and May 1994. Perpetrators who came forward
and admitted their guilt received amnesty against prosecution.^' The TRC had
the authority to investigate the role of corporations in apartheid South
16. Filártiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
17. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir.
2009) (Plaintiff sued Talisman Energy for aiding and abetting genocide and other gross human rights
violations committed by the Sudanese govemment in the context of the development of oil
concessions in Southem Sudan); See also Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 CIV. 8386
(KMW), 2002 WL 319887 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (plaintiffs sued Shell Oil Company for
complicity in the repression of Ogoni protests against the environmental damages caused by oil
platforms and in the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa). In June 2009, Shell settled out of court for $15.5
million. Ed Pilkington, Shell Pays Out $15.5m Over Saro-Wiwa Killing, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 8,
2009, 19:07), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/08/nigeria-usa. Plaintiffs sued UNOCAL
for complicity in forced labor, rape, and a murder carried out by soldiers along a natural gas pipeline
route in Myanmar. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). A settlement was reached in 2005
whose terms were not made public. Duncan Campbell, Energy Giant Agrees Settlement with
Burmese Villagers, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2004, 19:04),
http://www.guardian.co.uk.'world/2004/dec/15/burma.duncancampbell.
18. Some U.S. courts have held that grave human rights violations such as forced labour,
genocide, forced disappearances, extra-judicial killings and torture as well as the violation of other
norms of ius cogens status are violations of the law of nations. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 715-16 (9th Cir. 1992).
19. Decided in the affirmative for the first time in Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 but recently put into
doubt by Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), and Doe v. Nestle,
S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1124-28 (CD. Cal. 2010).
20. Accepted for the first time in the first Talisman decision, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
21. See The Promotion of National Unify and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 § 3 (S. Afi-.).
22. For a critical discussion see, e.g.. Jaco Bamard-Naudé, For Justice and Reconciliation to
Come: The TRC Archive, Big Business, and the Demand for Material Reparations, in JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 172 (François du Bois, Antje du Bois-Pedain
eds., 2008).
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but few corporations decided to come forward and take part in the process.
Nevertheless, the TRC concluded that "business was cenfral to the economy that
sustained the South African state during the apartheid years''^-' and that:
[T]he degree to which business maintained the status quo varied from direct
involvement in shaping govemment policies or engaging in activities directly
associated with repressive ñinctions to simply benefiting from operating in a
racially structured society in which wages were low and workers were denied
basic democratic rights.^''
With regard to the responsibility of banks, the TRC Report suggested that there
was a sfrong case for reparations, as "[t]he banks played an instrumental role in
prolonging apartheid from the time of the debt crisis in 1985 onwards. "^^
Many victims were unsatisfied with the TRC process, the govemment's
implementation of TRC findings, the reparations program, and the lack of
redress for gross human rights violations.^^ In 2002, several South African
victims' organizations, including the Khulumani Support Group, filed a lawsuit
in the Southem District of New York against a variety of multinational
corporations, including banks, for aiding and abetting or otherwise participating
in the intemational law violations committed by the apartheid regime. The
Khulumani case needs to be imderstood as "a logical continuation of the
outcome of the TRC."-^^
The original complaint, submitted in 2002 by the Khulumani plaintiffs,
alleged that:
[T]he participation of the defendants, companies in the key industries of oil,
armaments, banking, transportation, technology, and mining, was instrumental in
encouraging and furthering the abuses. Defendants' conduct was so integrally
connected to the abuses that apartheid would not have occurred in the same way
without their participation. ^^
But the Khulumani plaintiffs took a step beyond the structural approach, i.e., the
generalized role of business in apartheid-related crimes, to present specific
claims against the defendants, both individually and as a group. With regard to
the banking defendants, the original complaint stressed the importance of
foreign financing for the apartheid regime and specifically identified the
23. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Final Report, Vol. 6, Section 2, 58
(2003), available at http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/index.htm.
24. Id. at 140.
25. Id. at 146.
26. See, e.g., Erin Daly, Reparations in South Africa: A Cautionary Tale, 33 U. MEM. L. REV.
367,383-87 (2003).
27. Charles Abrahams, The TRC's Unfinished Business: Reparations, in TRUTH &
RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: 10 YEARS ON 34,36 (Charles Villa-Vicencio & Fanie du Toit
eds., 2006).
28. Complaint at 4, Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd, 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007)
available at www.khulumani.net/attachments/259_Khulumani%20Complaint.pdf The decision In re
South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) addresses the complaints
of both the Khulumani and the Ntsebeza plaintiffs.
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individual contributions of the various banking defendants. ^ ^
In November 2004, Judge Sprizzo of the Southem District of New York
dismissed the complaint, primarily on the grounds that plaintiffs could not
invoke liability for aiding and abetting under the ATCA.-'*' On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided that aiding and
abetting violations of the law of nations cannot give rise to liability under the
ATCA and allowed the plaintiffs to amend and specify their complaints.^'
The Khulumani plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint in October
2008, which reduced the number of defendants from more than twenty
corporations to eight, including two banks. They identified banking as one of
four strategic sectors—along with armaments, technology, and transportation—
that had been critical in assisting "the regime to perpetuate apartheid and
commit systematic acts of violence and terror . . . including extrajudicial killing;
torture; prolonged unlawful detention; and cmel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment."^^
The complaint alleged that the two remaining banking defendants, Barclays
and UBS, had made funds available to the apartheid regime on a large scale,-'-'
and that "without the funding provided by Barclays and UBS, the apartheid
regime could not have maintained control over the civilian population to the
same degree, nor could it have maintained and expanded its security forces to
the same degree."-'^ Specifically, the complaint alleged that defendant banks
"directly financed the South African security forces that carried out the most
brutal aspects of apartheid."^^ According to the complaint, the borrowed funds
were necessary to underwrite the growing costs of policing the apartheid state.-'^
The complaint also alleged that inclusion of these costs in non-security
related budgets obscured their true nature. For example, the education budget
contained costs for troops occupying black schools, while "loans to railway and
harbor systems assisted in the mobilization of the armed forces and trade
financing provided the computers and telecommunications equipment necessary
29. Khulumani Complaint, supra note 28, at 407-408, 414-415, 422, 431, 440-441, 471, 480,
and 491.
30. In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 320-24 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (taking this contradictory view one and a half years earlier).
31. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (Korman, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
32. First Amended Complaint at 145, In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp.
2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 03 Civ. 4524).
33. W. at 150.
34. W. at 151.
35. W. at 152.
36. W. at 169.
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to the efficient fiinctioning of a modem army."^^ The complaint makes evident
how difficult it is to distinguish between "innocent" and "harmfiil" loans in the
context of a regime that violates intemational law so pervasively. Most of the
plaintiffs' allegations do not refer to financing for particular crimes, but instead
try to show that some of the loans went to the security forces that perpetrated
crimes, demonstrating how the loans generally facilitated widespread violations.
C The Decision of April 2009^^
When the case came before Judge Scheindlin in the Southem District of
New York, the plaintiffs consisted of two groups: the Khulumani and the
Ntsebeza plaintiffs. The plaintiffs presented their claims based on both direct
and complicity liabilify theories. However, the Court excluded all legal bases
other than liability for aiding and abetting, which was the focus of the Court's
discussion.
I. General Actus Reus and Causation Considerations
Judge Scheindlin looked to intemational criminal law,-'^  Second Circuit
precedent,^*' and academic commentary'*' in holding that "the actus reus of
aiding and abetting in intemational criminal law requires practical assistance,
encotiragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the
perpetration of the crime."'*^ This definition seems to combine actus reus and
causation, as the effect of the assistance on the crime is a question of causation,
rather than of the actus reus itself
Though neither parfy disputed this standard, they argued according to
different interpretations, making it necessary for the Court to address what sort
of action amounts to having a substantial effect on the commission of gross
37. W. at 170.
38. In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
39. Id. at 257-58. The court relied, in particular, on Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-
17/1, Trial Chamber Judgment, 1| 235 (Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T,
Trial Chamber Judgment, \ 688 (May 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokió, Case No. lT-02-
60-A, Appeal Judgment, Y\\ '27, 134 (May 9, 2007); /fccorrf United States v. Von Weizsäcker ("The
Ministries Case"), 14 T.W.C., at 478 (1950).
40. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 277 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Katzmann, J., concurring) (cited in In re South African Apartheid, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 257-58).
41. Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in
the Courts, 6 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 304, 308 (2008); Tarek F. Maassarani, Four Counts of
Corporate Complicity: Altemative Forms of Accomplice Liability Under the Alien Tort Claims Act,
38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 39, 43-44, 55 (2005-2006); Shaw W. Scott, supra note 4 at 1531; Paul
Hoffman & Daniel Zaheer, The Rules of the Road: Federal Common Law and Aiding and Abetting
under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 47, 71-72 (2003).
42. In re South African Apartheid, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 257; See 0/5-0 Presbyterian Church of
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331, 337-38, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Doe v. Unoeal,
395 F.3d 932, 951 (9th Cir. 2002).
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human rights violations. The Court explained:
[I]t is (or should be) undisputed that simply doing business with a state or
individual who violates the law of nations is insufficient to create liability under
customary intemational law. International law does not impose liability for
declining to boycott a pariah state or to shun a war criminal. Aiding a criminal "is
not the same thing as aiding and abetting [his or her] alleged human rights
abuses."
The Court continued, stating that the plaintiffs' case was not based merely
on the allegation that "the defendants engaged in commerce with a pariah
state."'''' They had rather argued that the defendant corporations provided
essential assistance to the apartheid state, which had a substantial effect on the
crimes that victimized the plaintiffs.''^ Judge Scheindlin thus opposed the views
of various individuals, including Judge Sprizzo when he dismissed the case in
2004,^ *^  of Judge Korman (who was a dissenting judge when the case came
before the Second Circuit in 2007),''^ and of some commentators,''^ who
characterized the apartheid litigation as being about nothing other than accusing
the defendants of having done business with the apartheid regime. Instead, the
relevant issue for Judge Scheindlin was whether "doing business" with a regime
has a substantial effect on its commission of crimes. If plaintiffs can
demonsfrate a substantial effect, liabilify does not follow from merely doing
business with the regime, or from aiding and abetting the regime as such, but
rather from aiding and abetting the regime's violations.''^
Next, the Court queried how to determine whether a commercial activify
has a substantial effect on gross human rights violations. The Court approached
this question by citing with approval the statement of the ICTY:
[Ajssistance having a substantial effect "need not constitute an indispensable
element, that is, a conditio sine qua non for the acts of the principal." An
accessory may be found liable even if the crimes could have been carried out
through different means or with the assistance of another.^ "
The Court defined "substantial effect" by comparing two Nuremberg cases,
the Ministries Case and the Zyklon B Case^K In the Ministries Case, the
43. In re South Afriean Apartheid, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 257.
44. Id at 263.
45. Id. (with regard to the Ntsebeza plaintiffs); Id. at 266 (with regard to the Khulumani
plaintiffs).
46. In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
47. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 293-94 (2d Cir. 2007).
48. See Michael Ramsey, supra note 8, at 280.
49. See also, Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 289 (Hall, J., concurring).
50. In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 257-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(citing Proseeutor v. Furundzija, Case No. lT-95-17/1, Trial Chamber Judgment, 1| 209 (Dec. 10,
1998)).
51. U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, LAW REP. OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS (Vol. 1 ), Case. No.
9, The Zyklon B Case, The Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others, at 93-103 (1947).
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Nuremberg Tribunal had acquitted Karl Rasche, a member of the board of
managers of Dresdner Bank during the Nazi period, because the Tribunal did not
regard the bank's activities as criminal:
[T]o make a loan, knowing or having good reason to believe that the borrower
will us [sic\ the funds in financing enterprises which are employed in using labor
in violation of either national or intemational law . . . A bank sells money or
credit in the same manner as the merchandiser of any other commodity . . . Loans
or sale of commodities to be used in an unlawful enterprise may well be
condemned from a moral standpoint and reflect no credit on the part of the lender
or seller in either case, but the transaction can hardly be said to be a crime.
In the Zyklon B Case, on the other hand, Bruno Tesch, whose factory had
manufactured and sold the lethal gas used in the concenfration camps, was found
guilfy of aiding and abetting crimes against humanify for supplying the gas used
to execute allied nationals. ^ ^ Judge Scheindlin explained the different outcomes
in the two cases by focusing on qualitative aspects of the alleged assistance.
Money is a ñingible resource, as are building materials. However, poison gas is a
kilting agent, the means by which a violation of the law of nations was
committed. The provision of goods specifically designed to kill, to inflict pain, or
to cause other injuries resulting from violations of customary intemational law
bear a closer causal connection to the principal crime than the sale of raw
materials or the provision of loans.
Based on this analysis. Judge Scheindlin came to the conclusion that, "in
the context of commercial services, provision of the means by which a violation
of the law is carried out is sufficient to meet the actus reus requirement of aiding
and abetting liability under customary intemational law."^^ Given that money
can never be the direct means through which human rights violations occur, the
provision of commercial loans therefore seemingly cannot meet the actus reus
test of aiding and abetting liability as defined by Judge Scheindlin, whatever its
effect on the commission of offenses.
The implications of Judge Scheindlin's approach to actus reus and
causation in suits for aiding and abetting become more readily apparent when
looking at her analysis of the claims against the automotive and technologies
defendants (in this case, in addition to banks, claims were also brought against
corporations that provided the South African apartheid regime with automobiles,
technologies, and arms), as the Court examines the actus reus of these
defendants in a much more nuanced way than that of the defendant banks. This
Article introduces some relevant features of this analysis, followed by a
discussion of the consequences of this approach for cases against corporations
for complicify in the context of commercial transactions in general, and
commercial loans, in particular.
52. United States v. Von Weizsäcker ('The Ministries Case"), 14 T.W.C., at 622 (1950).
53. "The Zyklon B Case", supra note 51, at 93-103.
54. In re South Afincan Apartheid, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 258.
55. Id. at 259.
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2. Claims Against the Technologies Defendants
Regarding the technologies defendants, the Court first examined the
allegations "that IBM aided and abetted the South African Government's
denationalization of black South Africans through the provision of computers,
software, training, and technical support."^^ In this instance, IBM sold
"computers used to register individuals, strip them of their South African
citizenship, and segregate them."^^ They also helped to develop the software
"specifically designed to produce identity documents and effectuate
denationalization," which Judge Scheindlin characterized as "indispensable" to
South Africa's "geographic segregation and racial discrimination."^^
Additionally, IBM allegedly provided equipment that produced records
"necessary to deliberately denationalize a large proportion of Black South
Africans."^^ Given IBM's activities. Judge Scheindlin held that the Ntsebeza
plaintiffs satisfied the actus reus requirement for aiding and abetting arbifrary
denationalization and the crime of apartheid.^^
Equally, the actus reus requirement of aiding and abetting apartheid was
met by allegations that "defendants IBM and Fujitsu supplied computer
equipment 'designed to track and monitor civilians with the purpose of
enforcing the racist, oppressive laws of apartheid'" as well as the software and
hardware "to run the system . . . 'used to track racial classification and
movement for security purposes."'^' This amounted to substantial assistance of
the crime of apartheid because it was essential in "implementing and enforcing
the racial pass laws and other sfructural underpinnings of the apartheid
system"^^ and constituted "the means by which the South African Government
cartied out both racial segregation and discrimination."^-^
Demonsfrating the nuances of this approach, the Court dismissed
allegations that IBM aided and abetted cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
(CIDT). Although the documents created by IBM software "helped target"
individuals, the Court held that the computers were neither an "essential
element" nor "the means" of CIDT.^'' The Court similarly rejected the argument
that "every computer system provided to the Govemment of South Africa or
South African defense contractors" was automatically "sufficiently tied to
56. Id at 265.
57. Id
58. Id
59. Id
60. Id
61. /i/. at 268.
62. Id
63. Id
64. Id at 265-66.
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violations of customary intemational law."^^ For example, the Court held that
"the mere sale of computers to the Department of Prisons - despite the widely
held knowledge that political prisoners were routinely held and tortured without
trial - does not constitute substantial assistance to that torture."^^ Finally, with
regard to the allegation that IBM had supplied computers to armaments
manufacturers that were cmcial to the South African Defense Forces, the Court
suggested that "the sale of equipment used to enhance the logistics capabilities
of an arms manufacturer is not the same thing as selling arms used to carry out
exfrajudicial killing; it is merely doing business with a bad actor."^^
These are significant clarifications of how Judge Scheindlin characterized
the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability in the context of the provision of
commercial services. First of all, even though her reliance on the Zyklon B case
might have given a different impression, she emphasized that human rights
violations can occur through means other than inherently physically harmful
products. Products such as computers and software can equally qualify as means
if they are specifically designed to implement particular policies or facilitate
human rights violations, or if they are indispensable and essential for carrying
them out. On the other hand, she rejected a finding of complicity where the
computer systems were neither essential nor indispensable. The Court thus
seems to replace analyzing the effects of computers and programs on the
commission of the crimes with an assessment of whether they provided the
direct means for committing these violations. Where, as in the allegations of
CIDT, the computers and programs were not the direct means of perpetration,
there was no need for further analysis of the link between the technology and the
violations to assess whether its provision had a substantial effect.
It is certainly true that "the mere sale of computers to the Department of
Prisons—despite the widely held knowledge that political prisoners were
routinely held and tortured without trial—does not constitute substantial
assistance to that torture,"^^ and that "the sale of computers to the South African
Defense Forces does not constitute aiding and abetting any and all violations of
customary intemational law that the military committed."^^ Neither does
"'sustaining the apartheid regime' render the technology defendants liable for
aiding and abetting all violations of the law of nations committed in apartheid-
era South Africa."''*^
However, given that the actus reus test is one of practical assistance that
has a substantial effect on the commission of the offenses, the essential question
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
at 268.
at 268-69.
at 268.
at 269.
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should be what effect, if any, the sale of computers had on the crimes'
commission, rather than whether the underlying transaction provided the direct
means for committing the violations.^' If a substantial effect requires that the
product or service provided is the direct or indispensable means through which
the violations occur, this has important implications for complicity hability of
lenders, as money can never be the means through which violations occtir.
3. Claims Against Automotive Defendants
Plaintiffs accused Daimler, Ford, and General Motors of having aided and
abetted the apartheid regime in various ways, for example by selling both
military and non-military vehicles to the army and the police that were used for
raids in townships and confrolling protests. The Court was satisfied that the
plaintiffs' allegations against all three defendants were sufficient to sustain
claims for aiding and abetting extrajudicial killing:
[They] sold heavy trucks, armored personnel carriers, and other specialized
vehicles to the South African Defense Forces and the Special Branch, the South
African police unit charged with investigating anti-apartheid groups. These
vehicles were the means by which security forces carried out attacks on protesting
civilians and other antiapartheid activists; thus by providing such vehicles to the
South Afi-ican Government, the automotive companies substantially assisted
extrajudicial killing.
The Court similarly found a claim of aiding and abetting extrajudicial
killings and apartheid^^ sufficient where it alleged that: "Daimler sold 'Unimog'
military vehicles to the South Afiican Government, as well as components of the
'Casspir' and 'Buffer' vehicles that were used by intemal securify forces . . . to
pafrol the townships and . . . carry out extrajudicial killings."^^ The Court
characterized these vehicles as "the means by which the South African Defense
Forces killed black South Africans as part of the maintenance of a system of
state-sponsored apartheid,"^^ which was sufficient to fulfill "the actus reus
requirement of aiding and abetting, in this case of the crimes of extrajudicial
killing and apartheid."^^
However, the allegations that Ford and GM sold cars and tmcks to the
South Afiican police and military forces, and continued to do so afier the
imposition of export restrictions, were insufficient to support a claim because
the particular vehicles "had no military customization or similar features that
liak[ed] them to an illegal use" and were "simply too similar to ordinary vehicle
71. Id.
72. Id. at 264.
73. Id. at 266.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id
464 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 30:2
^^  Again, the court focused on the inherent qualify of the goods, rather
than on the use the regime would make of them. However, this distinction seems
arbifrary. Military vehicles could conceivably be sold for legitimate reasons, and
ordinary vehicles could be used to carry out serious violations of intemational
law. In line with the actus reus test of substantial effect, a more accurate test
would focus on whether the sale of the vehicle, with or without military
customization, substantially furthered the commission of the crime committed
by the regime. ^ ^ If a substantial effect can be sho-wn, the actus reus of
complicity liabilify is met and liabilify would depend on the defendant's mens
rea.
4. Claims Against the Banking Defendants
Judge Scheindlin's strict approach towards actus reus meant that she easily
rejected all allegations against banking defendants because the loans provided
did not directly enable human rights violations:
The Khulumani plaintiffs' claims against Barclays and UBS stem primarily fi-om
the provision of loans by the two banks and the purchase of South African
defense forces bonds.. . [S]upplying a violator of the law of nations with ñinds—
even funds that could not have been obtained but for those loans—is not
sufficiently connected to the primary violation to fulfill the actus reus
requirement of aiding and abetting a violation of the law of nations.
Given this sweeping rejection of liabilify, without any analysis of the use
and purpose of the loans or the effect they had on the commission of gross
human rights violations by the apartheid regime, it seems fair to conclude that
Judge Scheindlin did not regard commercial lending as an activify that can give
rise to complicity liability for the crimes it facilitated. This interpretation is
aligned with the Court's holding that commercial activities can only
substantially affect the commission of gross human rights violations if they
provide the direct means through which these violations are carried out.^ *' An
intermediate step is always necessary to link loaned funds to violations.
This actus reus or causation approach proffered by Judge Scheindlin thus
exempts whole indusfries, such as finance, from responsibility without requiring
a case-by-case analysis. Indeed, even if the defendant provided loans with the
specific intent to ftirther gross human rights violations, no liabilify would be
incurred under Judge Scheindlin's approach because the money provided was
not the direct means to the violation.
77. Id. at 267 ("The sale of cars and trucks without military customization or similar features
that link them to an illegal use does not meet the actus reus requirement of aiding and abetting a
violation of the law of nations").
78. But see Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1096, 1101 (CD. Cal. 2010)
(distinction made by the court was cited with approval).
79. In re South African Apartheid, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 269.
80. Id. at 258.
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5. Critical Reflections
In the South African Apartheid Litigation case, the actus reus of complicity
liabilify for the provision of commercial goods and services depended on two
factors: (1) whether the goods were inherently dangerous or neutral, and (2)
whether they were the direct means through which the crimes were committed.
The Court excluded as too remote from the commission of the principal offense
the provision of goods, such as money, that are inherently neutral, and which
cannot, by their very nature, be the instrument with which violations are carried
out. On the other hand, supplying goods that are specifically designed for
harmful purposes or that provide the direct means for carrying out gross htmian
rights violations does amount to the actus reus of complicify liabilify. In those
cases, defendants can only avoid complicify liability if they show that they
thought the goods would be used for legitimate purposes.^' With inherentiy
harmful goods, an examination of the corporation's mens rea is therefore
important to filter out those cases in which no liabilify arises. For neutral goods
that are not the direct means of committing violations, however, no mens rea
analysis is necessary as proof of liability already fails at the actus reus or
causation stage. Therefore, while mens rea is irrelevant for neufral goods such as
money, liability for other goods decisively depends on whether the company had
the requisite mens rea.
The Court relied on the Rome Statute in support of its view that whether
the goods provided constitute the means through which the crime is committed
is relevant for deciding aiding and abetting liability.^^ Article 25(3)(c) of the
Statute makes an accessory to a crime liable if he or she "aids, abets or
otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including
providing the means for its commission."^^ The Intemational Law Commission
has likewise suggested that aiding and abetting liability requires that an
accomplice "provide the kind of assistance which contributes directly and
substantially to the commission of the crime, for example by providing the
means which enable the perpetrator to commit the crime."^'' Providing the
means for the commission of the offense thus clearly frilfils the actus reus of
aiding and abetting liability. This constitutes only one example of an activity
that could do so. However, the Rome Statute does not necessarily require
providing the direct means in order to trigger complicity liability. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the court in Doe v. Nestle approved Judge Scheindlin's
81. Id. at 258, n. 157 ("Although such goods may have legitimate uses, that issue is addressed
by the mens rea element").
82. /í/. at 259, n. 158.
83. Rome Statute of the Intemational Criminal Court art. 25(3)(c), July 1, 2002, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
84. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 48th Sess., May 6-July 26, 1996, 21, U.N. Doc. A/51/10
(1996).
466 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 30:2
approach,*^ although it imparted a slightly different focus on the discussion.
While it agreed that direct instmmentality was the test for finding liability, the
Court downplayed the difference between neutral and non-neutral goods and
instead looked at the nature of the fransaction. It concentrated on the idea that
ordinary commercial transactions, without more, do not violate intemational
law.86
Doe V. Nestle supported this conclusion with the decision in Corrie v.
Caterpillar.^"^ In that case, Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip and the West
Bank filed an ATCA claim against a bulldozer manufacturer.^^ The plaintiffs
claimed that they had suffered harm, including death and loss of home, as a
result of demolitions by Israeli military using bulldozers bought from the
defendant.^^ They alleged that the defendant knew or should have known that
the bulldozers sold to the Israeli army would be used for such purposes.^*'
In Corrie, the Court rejected a finding of liability, holding that "[o]ne who
merely sells goods to a buyer is not an aider and abettor of crimes that the buyer
might commit, even if the seller knows that the buyer is likely to use the goods
unlawfully, because the seller does not share the specific intent to further the
buyer's venture."^' In Doe v. Nestle, the Court confrasted the sale of bulldozers
with the provision of customized military vehicles in the South African
Apartheid Litigation case.^^ From this comparison, the Court draws the
conclusion that "a plaintiff must allege something more than ordinary
commercial transactions in order to state a claim for aiding and abetting human
rights violations."^^ This is uncontested, as commercial transactions alone do
not result in any form of liability. The more important question in the context of
an analysis of the South African Apartheid Litigation case is whether this means
that commercial fransactions should be excluded at the actus reus level, unless
additional factors such as the customization of the goods are present, or whether
even ordinary commercial fransactions can amount to practical acts of assistance
that have a substantial effect on the commission of the principal offender's
crimes.
85. Doe V. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (CD. Cal. 2010)
86. Id at 1099.
87. Id. al 1095. The court in Doe v. Nestle also based this view on Nuremberg case law and on
Almog V. Arab Bank PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, (E.D.N.Y. 2007); See Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at
1088-92, 1096-97, 1099-1100. Its analysis of these decisions will be discussed later on in this
Article.
88. Cortie V. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (W.D. Wash. 2005), aff'd on other
grounds, 503 F.3d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 2007)
89. Corrie, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 1027 at 1023.
90. Id
91. W. at 1027.
92. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
93. Id. at 1096.
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The decision in Corrie seems to point towards the latter interpretation. In
Corrie, it seems to have been decisive for discarding liability that the "seller
does not share the specific intent to further the buyer's venture."^'* The Court
therefore does not suggest that the sale of the bulldozers to the Israeli army did
not have a substantial effect on the destmction of the homes. Instead, the
determinative factor for excluding liability was the lack of mens rea on the part
of the seller with regard to the illegal use of the goods supplied, not the
commercial character of the transaction.
This becomes even elearer when taking into aecount that the Court's
approach in Corrie was informed by reliance on Blankenship.^^ Albeit in the
context of discussing liability for criminal conspiracy, rather than aiding and
abetting liability under the ATCA, the Court in Blankenship suggested that:
"Mere" sellers and buyers are not automatically conspirators. If it were otherwise,
companies that sold cellular phones to teenage punks who have no use for them
other than to set -up drug deals would be in trouble, and many legitimate
businesses would be required to monitor their customers' activities . . . Yet this
does not get us ver>' far, for no rule says that a supplier cannot']om a conspiracy
through which the product is put to an unlawful end.^ ^
Blankenship therefore does not lend support to the view that commercial
transactions cannot result in liability. The issue was explained more clearly in
Pino-Pérez, another non-ATCA case dealing with criminal aiding and abetting
claims:^^ "One who sells a small - or for that matter a large - quantity of drugs
to a kingpin is not by virtue of the sale alone an aider and abettor. It depends on
what he knows and what he wants[.]"^^ The Supreme Court in Direct Sales,^^
yet another drug related criminal conspiracy case that was equally decided
outside of the framework of the ATCA, also rejected the view that "one who
sells to another with knowledge that the buyer will use the article for an illegal
purpose cannot, under any circumstances, be found guilty of conspiracy with the
buyer to further his illegal end."'^*'
Even though these cases have been decided under a different legal
framework, the ATCA cases cited and relied upon Blankenship^^^ to inform the
94. Corrie, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 1027.
95. Id,
96. United States v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283, 285-86 (7th Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original).
In Blankenship, the defendant let his house trailer to a group that used it to cook methamphetamine,
accepted a down-payment for the lease but then got cold feet and dropped out of the agreement. Id,
at 284.
97. United States v. Pino-Pérez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1232 (7th Cir. 1989) (defendant was accused
of aiding and abetting the operations of a kingpin whom he supplied with illegal dmgs).
98. W. at 1235.
99. Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 704-707 (1943) (petitioner was a dmg
company that sold drtjgs by mail order to a physician who resold them illegally).
100. W. at 709.
101. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1027 (W.D. Wash. 2005); Doe v. Nestle,
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discussion of the relevant liabilify standards for the provision of commercial
goods, and Blankenship, in tum, referred to Direct Sales and Pino-Pérez.^^^
These cases teach that, in the particular context of criminal liability for
conspiracy or aiding and abetting, commercial transactions that might in some
way further criminal offenses do not always result in liabilify. However, the
commercial nattire of the transaction does not per se exempt the actor from such
liabilify. The mens rea of the supplier with regard to the illegal use of the goods
provided is much more important than the commercial character of the
transaction for determining liabilify. Particularly instmctive in this respect is the
analysis carried out by the Supreme Court in Direct Sales:
All articles of commerce may be put to illegal ends. But all do not have inherently
the same susceptibility to harmful and illegal use. Nor, by the same token, do all
embody the same capacity, from their very nature, for giving the seller notice the
buyer will use them unlawfully. Gangsters, not hunters or small boys, comprise
the normal private market for machine guns. So drug addicts fiimish the normal
outlet for morphine which gets outside the restricted channels of legitimate trade.
This difference is important for two purposes. One is for making certain that the
seller knows the buyer's intended illegal use. The other is to show that by the sale
he intends to further, promote and cooperate in it. . . . The difference between
sugar, cans, and other articles of normal trade, on the one hand, and narcotic
drugs, machine guns and such restricted commodities, on the other, arising fi-om
the latters' inherent capacity for harm and from the very fact they are restricted,
makes a difference in the quantity of proof required to show knowledge that the
buyer will utilize the article unlawñilly. Additional facts, such as quantity sales,
high pressure sales methods, abnormal increases in the size of the buyer's
purchases, etc., which would be wholly innocuous or not more than ground for
suspicion in relation to unrestricted goods, may furnish conclusive evidence, in
respect to restricted articles, that the seller knows the buyer has an illegal object
and enterprise. ' ^ ^
While not providing binding precedents for courts delineating the limits of
aiding and abetting liabilify in ATCA cases, these considerations are
nevertheless interesting when reconsidering the analysis carried out in South
African Apartheid Litigation. The approach adopted in Direct Sales supports the
view that while the inherent qualify of the goods or services provided, or the
their relation to the commission of violations, might influence the depth of the
actus reus and mens rea analysis that is required in each case, these factors
should not be decisive in themselves and cannot replace a case-by-case analysis.
The implications of the foregoing discussion become clear when applying
them, by way of example, to Judge Scheindlin's discussion of the claims against
the automotive defendants. The military specifications of the vehicles might
then have an impact at both the actus reus and the mens rea levels, but they
should not be determinative at either. To the extent that military vehicles have a
at 28.
102. United States v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283, 286 (7th Cir. 1992).
103. Direct Sales Co., 319 U.S. at 710-11.
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different and more substantial effect on the commission of the crimes than
ordinary vehicles, this would need to be demonsfrated in each case, not simply
implied from the military specifications of the vehicles in and of themselves. At
the same time, the inherent quality of the goods could be relevant for
determining the mental state of the defendants, as the illegitimate use might be
more obvious to the corporation where the good has inherently harmful
qualities. Importantly, the mens rea would have to be established on a case-by-
case basis, both where the goods are inherently harmftil and where they are not,
as what gives rise to liability is the mental state of the corporation in relation to
the usage of the goods.
To eliminate any need to perform a case-by-case analysis of the effect of
the act of assistance on the violation, and of the proximity of the defendant to it,
as follows from Judge Scheindlin's approach in the South African Apartheid
Litigation case, means that certain acts (particularly providing funding, but also
selling goods that are not inherently harmftil but might potentially be used for
harmful purposes) are automatically shielded from liability. A corporation
could, for example, escape liabilify by selling only commercial, but not military
vehicles to a regime, with the knowledge or even intent that human rights
violators use these vehicles to commit gross human rights violations. Where the
impact of the sale on the violations is the same, there is no justifiable reason to
distinguish between the two sales. It would be arbitrary to impose liability in one
case but not the other. ' ''''
Admittedly, Judge Scheindlin's approach provides an efficient, bright-line
rule, removing the need to develop more refined criteria according to which the
substantial effect of commercial activities on gross human rights violations can
be established. In the context of commercial loans, this is not an easy task.
However, convenience and the difficulties of defining criteria cannot justify
adopting an approach that leads to arbitrary results regarding liabilify for
commercial activity. It is necessary to find a principled way to distinguish
between acceptable business activities and those that give rise to complicity
liabilify, and the net must not be so wide as to hold corporadons indiscriminately
liable for all offenses committed by regimes with which they do business.
Nevertheless, the actus reus of aiding and abetting should not depend on the
nature of the corporate activity, but rather on its effect on the commission of the
offense. Therefore, the effect of the corporation's commercial activify, as well as
its mens rea, need to be subjected to a thorough analysis in each case. Absence
of such review would create a considerable gap in corporate accountability,
encouraging, or at least providing no incentive to refrain from, business
fransacdons that facilitate gross human rights violations indirectly. This would
often leave victims of such violations without effective remedies.
104. See also Norman Farrell, Attributing Criminal Liability to Corporate Actors, 8 J. lNT.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 873,891 (2010).
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The undesirable consequences of the approach adopted in South African
Apartheid Litigation become pariicularly obvious with regard to liability for
financing gross human rights violations. In that context, it has the effect of
absolving commercial lenders from all complicity liabilify, no matter what effect
the loans might have on the commission of gross human rights violations and
regardless of the mens rea of the financier. On the other hand, the approach
might also have unfair consequences by presuming causation where inherently
dangerous goods are provided to a regime that uses them to commit grave
human rights violations. Under the South African Apartheid Litigation analysis,
the fine line between acceptable business transactions and complicity liability
would rest on mens rea alone.
III.
LIABILITY FOR FUNDING GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
IN THE LIGHT OF NUREMBERG CASE LAW
In South African Apartheid Litigation, the Court's approach to actus reus
and causation in the context of commercial loans decisively relied on
Nuremberg case law, in particular the Court's understanding that Ihe Nuremberg
Military Tribunal's decision in the Ministries Case against Karl Rasche set a
precedent that commercial lending does not give rise to such liabilify. "^ ^ This
Section will examine some of the relevant Nuremberg cases, analyzing whether
the South African Apartheid Litigation interpretation does justice to the decision
against Rasche. This Section also will explore more generally what courts may
leam from cases decided in Nuremberg regarding liability for financing.
A. The Case Against Rasche
Karl Rasche was a member of the board of managers of the Dresdner Bank.
In the report of the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS), he
was described as "one of the key liaisons between the Dresdner Bank and the
SS, Nazi Parfy, and govemment so that the bank might function as an integral
part of the Nazi war machine."'"^ He was charged with different counts of war
crimes and crimes against humanity. The Tribunal started its discussion of his
liabilify on count five (war crimes and crimes against humanify, atrocities and
offenses committed against civilian populations) with the statement that:
The evidence elearly establishes that the Dresdner Bank loaned very large sums
of money to various SS enterprises which employed large numbers of inmates of
concentration eamps, and also to Reieh enterprises and agencies engaged in the
105. Id. For a similar reading ofthat deeision see Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504
F.3d 254, 293 (2d Cir. 2007) (Korman, J., eoneurring); for additional reading, see Chimène Keitner,
Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 61, 91 -92 (20C8).
106. CHRISTOPHER SIMPSON, WAR CRIMES OF THE DEUTSCHE BANK AND THE DRESDNER
BANK: OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT (U.S.) REPORTS 396 (Holmes and Meier 2002).
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so-called resettlement programs.
The Tribunal had to'decide whether these loans would give rise to the
personal criminal liability of Rasche for the crimes charged under count five. In
order to address the issue, the Tribunal first looked at Rasche's criminal
responsibility for having been a member of Himmler's Circle of Friends, and for
having approved, and in some instances even insisted on, large annual
contributions by Dresdner Bank to a fund placed at Himmler's personal
disposal.'"^ Himmler was the Reichsfuehrer of the SS and the German Minister
of the Interior, and he was also responsible for the extermination policy in
Germany's concentration camps. The Tribunal rejected any liability of Rasche
related to these confributions on the grounds that there was no evidence that
"Rasche knew that any part of the ftmd to which the bank made contributions
was intended to be or was ever used by Himmler for any unlawfiil purposes."'"^
This statement suggests that, had Rasche known that the funds made
available to Himmler were used or had been intended to be used for unlawful
purposes (i.e., had the necessary mens rea been present), he might have incurred
liability for approving or encouraging those confributions. Moreover, the
Tribunal seems to suggest that it would not have been necessary to show that the
specific confributions made by Dresdner Bank were intended to be used for
unlawful purposes, but rather merely that any part of the ftind toward which
these contributions were made had such an intended use. This sets quite a low
actus reus standard, which takes into account the ftingibility of money. On the
other hand, the Tribunal implies a high mens rea threshold when suggesting that
it cannot infer solely from the fact that Rasche knowingly provided funds to
Himmler that Rasche had the requisite knowledge regarding the unlawful use of
the ftind.
However, the Tribunal held that Rasche did have the requisite knowledge
for the loans Dresdner Bank made to SS enterprises, which employed slave
labor and otherwise fiinded the Nazi resettlement program."^ The Court
reasoned that banks generally seek to leam the purposes of their loans as a
matter of practice and found it inconceivable that Rasche did not have the
necessary knowledge. ' ' '
It is in this context that the Tribunal made its well-known statement that
107. United States v. Von Weizsäcker ("The Ministries Case"), 14 T.W.C, at 621 (1950).
108. W. at 621-22.
109. W. at 622.
110. Id. "The defendant is a banker and businessman of long experience and is possessed of a
keen and active mind. Bankers do not approve or make loans in the number and amount made by the
Dresdner Bank without ascertaining, having, or obtaining information or knowledge as to the
purpose for which the loan is sought, and how it is to be used. It is inconceivable to us that the
defendant did not possess that knowledge, and we find that he did."
111. Id.
472 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 30:2
has since been interpreted by some courts"^ and commentators"^ as authority
for a general rejection of liability for commercial loans that financs gross human
rights violations or other serious violations of intemational law.
The real question is, is it a crime to make a loan, knowing or having good reason
to believe that the borrower will use the funds in financing enterprises which are
employed in using labor in violation of either national or intemational law? Does
[Rasche] stand in any different position than one who sells supplies or raw
materials to a builder building a house, knowing that the structure will be used for
an unlawñil purpose? A bank sells money or credit in the same manner as the
merchandiser of any other commodity. It does not become a partner in enterprise,
and the interest charged is merely the gross profit that the bank realizes from the
transaction, out of which it must deduct its business costs, and from which it
hopes to realize a net proflt. Loans or sale of commodities to be used in an
unlawful enterprise may well be condemned from a moral standpoint and reflect
no credit on the part of the lender or seller in either case, but the transaction can
hardly be said to be a crime. Our duty is to bring to justice those guilty of
violating intemational law, and we are not prepared to state that such loans
constitute a violation ofthat law.
This statement has been interpreted in a variety of ways regarding the
reasons for which the Tribunal rejected Rasche's criminal liability in this
context. It has sometimes been suggested that the Tribunal rejected his liability
for making the loans because it insisted on a more sfringent mens rea standard
- than knowledge. ' ' ^  However, given that the Tribunal applied a mens rea
standard of knowledge to the analyses of both of the donations made to Himmler
and the loans to the various SS enterprises, this does not seem plausible. Indeed,
nothing in the above statement suggests that Rasche's intent regarding the use of
the loans would have made any difference in establishing his criminal liability.
Instead, it seems that Judge Scheindlin was right in suggesting that Rasche was
found not guilty in this context because the Tribunal was of the view that
making commercial loans, even with clear knowledge regarding their unlawful
use, did not satisfy the actus reus for complicity liabilitv."^
The Court rejected charges against Rasche under count six (war crimes and
crimes against humanity, plunder and spoliation) for the same reason as those
112. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 292-93 (2d Cir. 2007) (Korman, J.,
concurring); In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2009);
Doe V. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1088-90 (CD. Cal. 2010).
113. Chimène Keitner, supra note 105 at 91-92.
114. United States v. Von Weizsäcker ("The Ministries Case"), 14 T.W.C., at 622 (1950).
115. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009);
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 276 (Katzmann, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Shriram
Bhashyam, Knowledge or Purpose? The Khulumani Litigation and the Standard for Aiding and
Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 245, 269 (2008); Michael
Ramsey, supra note 8, at 307.
116. See also Norman Farrell, supra note 104 at 887-888; Katherine Gallagher, Civil Litigation
and Transnational Business, 8 J. INT. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 745, 763 (2010); Andïei Mamolea, The
Future of Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Roadmap, 51
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79,128-29 (2011).
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under count five. These charges concemed activities in Poland, Russia, and the
Baltic countries that largely consisted of giving financial assistance to agencies
that were active in Germany's spoliation program in these territories."^ Thus, as
in the context of Rasche's liabilify under count five for the commercial loans
made to the SS, the Tribunal rejected the possibility that liability under count six
would be triggered by making funds available to those who committed crimes.
However, the general conclusion widely drawn from this case that
commercial loans are always exempt from complicify liability"* is put into
doubt when examining the Tribunal's discussion of Rasche's liability under
count seven, which implies that making loans can fulfill the actus reus of aiding
and abetting liability. This count alleged war crimes and crimes against
humanity in the context of slave labor for having "participated in the financing
of SS enterprises which used concenfration camp labor on a wide scale and
under inhumane conditions.""^ It is interesting to look at the Tribunal's
reasoning in some detail.
Careful consideration of the evidence as adduced by the prosecution and by
the defense fails to reveal that the defendant Rasche did in fact wrongfully
participate "in sponsoring, supporting, approving, and obtaining approval for
loans totaling millions of reichsmarks to SS enterprises which used
concentration camp labor." The testimony reveals that over time the Dresdner
Bank did loan various amounts to SS enterprises that employed concenfration
camp labor. But the prosecution failed to establish its contention that Rasche
was a bank decision-maker with respect to the making of such loans. Further, it
appears that such loans were usually sectired.'^"
The Tribtmal added that even if Rasche had played a decisive role in the
granting of the loans to the SS, it would be difficult to find him guilty of
participation in the slave-labor program on that account as "[t]he evidence
adduced by the prosecution to show knowledge on the part of Rasche as to what
was taking place in the SS enterprises with respect to slave labor . . . [was]
unconvincing."'^' Because Rasche testified credibly as to having no personal
knowledge of the slave-labor program, he was not subject to complicify liability
under count seven.'^^ Therefore, the Tribunal's refrisal to find Rasche liable
117. United States v. Von Weizsäcker ("The Ministries Case"), 14 T.W.C., at 784 (1950) ("As
hereinbefore indicated, on this question in discussions in our treatment of count five, and in view of
the evidence generally with respect to the credits here involved, we do not find adequate basis for a
holding of guilty on account of such loans"). He was convicted, though, for having actively
participated in the illegal takeover of banks and companies and in Aryanization programs in
Bohemia-Moravia and Holland.
118. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 292-93 (Korman, J., concurring); In re South African Apartheid
Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Chimène Keitner, supra note 105 at 91-92.
119. United States v. Von Weizsäcker ("The Ministries Case"), 14 T.W.C, at 853 ( 1950).
120. Id
121. W. at 853-54.
122. Id. at 854-55 ("The defense testimony was to the effect that the defendant had no such
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tumed on insufficient proof of knowledge and on his limited role in making the
loans.
While the Tribunal emphasized the ordinary commercial nature of the
loans,'^^ these statements were made in the context of a detailed analysis of the
particular role played by Rasche in granting them, and of his knowledge with
regard to their use. This suggests that the commercial character of the
transactions was mainly significant for giving Rasche little reason to be aware of
the unlawful nature of the activities being financed. However, there is no reason
to infer from this that their commercial nature meant that these loans could not
have resulted in Rasche's liabilify. If this were tme, the detailed discussion
undertaken by the Tribunal in order to reject Rasche's responsibility under count
seven would have been superfiuous. Instead, it seems that the Tribunal rejected
Rasche's liabilify under count seven because making loans is an activity that is
per se exempt from liabilify, but rather because there was not sufficient proof to
justify holding Rasche personally criminally liable for the loans made by
Dresdner Bank.
Looking at the decision against Rasche in its entirety, the judgment does
not suggest that complicity liabilify for commercial loans is always excluded. At
best, the decision lends limited support to the approach in South African
Apartheid Litigation. As its conclusion in this respect is primarily based on the
Rasche decision, which rejected all liabilify for loans and other inherently
neufral commercial goods, it stands on rather weak ground.
B. The Case Against Puhl
Another relevant Nuremberg decision regarding the liability of bankers is
that of Emil Puhl. Puhl had been Depufy President of the German Reichsbank
during the Third Reich and played an active role in arranging "for the receipt,
classification, deposit, conversion and disposal of properties taken by the SS
from victims exterminated in concenfration camps."'^'' He had, inter alia, been
actively involved in organizing the recasting of gold from the teeth and crowns
of concenfration camp inmates. According to the Tribunal:
The receipt, realization, and disposition of stolen goods can hardly constitute a
knowledge. We cannot go so far as to enunciate the proposition that the official of a loaning bank is
chargeable with the illegal operations alleged to have resulted from loans or which may have been
contemplated by the borrower. Rasehe as an official of the loaning bank under the circumstances
surrounding the loans here under consideration, as revealed by the evidenee, did not thereby beeome
a criminal partner of the SS in the slave-labor program. The Tribunal finds the defendant Rasehe not
guilty under count seven").
123. Id. at 853 ("It appears that the loans, despite the claims of the prosecution to the contrary,
were for the most part short-term loans and bear all the indications of having been conducted with
the same objectives in mind as usually prompt the making of loans by any banking institution").
124. W. at 609.
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banking operation.'^ ^ . . . That this was not looked upon as an ordinary
transaction within the scope of its corporate purposes or official functions by the
Reieh Bank officials, including PuhK is evidenced by the extreme secrecy with
which the transaction was handled'^" . . . His part in this transaction was not that
of a mere messenger or businessman. He went beyond the ordinary range of his
duties to give directions that the appropriate departments of the bank handle the
matter secretly. It is to be said in his favor that he neither originated the matter
and that it was probably repugnant to him. . . . But without doubt he was a
consenting participant in part of the execution of the entire plan, although his
participation was not a major one. We find him guilty under count five.'^^
Whereas Rasche's activities were typical for any bank official, Puhl had
clearly engaged in activities that cannot be regarded as part of normal banking
practices. Whereas "banks routinely lend money, they presumably do not
routinely launder gold teeth, making the latter conduct seem more egregious and
worthy of criminal punishment."'^^ Indeed, unlike the mere provision of funds,
receiving and laundering stolen properfy is, in itself, usually regarded as
criminal behavior,'^9 made more serious by the fact that the gold teeth were
likely obtained through murder.
Puhl was also charged under count seven (war crimes and crimes against
humanity, slave labor) with having been active in financing enterprises that were
primarily created to exploit slave labor, including the negotiation of a massive
loan between the SS and DEST, a company specifically designed to utilize
concenfration camp labor.'^'^ He was also accused of having assisted DEST in
"securing additional large loans, obtaining reductions on interest rates on such
loans, and receiving extensions of time for repayment."'-" However, although
Puhl had held positions of considerable responsibility and authority, the
Tribunal held that he did not play a decisive role and stressed that it was
"doubtful whether defendant Puhl did more than act as a conduit in these
particular transactions."'^^ Accordingly, the Tribunal dismissed charges against
Puhl on this count.
It seems that here again, just as in the case against Rasche regarding slave
labor, the Tribunal regarded facilitating the loan as potentially relevant, but did
not consider Puhl's role as sufficiently established to result in individual
criminal liabilify.
125. / ¿ a t 617.
126. /(/.at 618.
127. Id. at 620-21. (Count five consists of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and atrocities
and offences committed against civilian populations.)
128. Chimène Keitner, supra note 105 at 92.
129. I am grateful to Dr. Jeff King, Senior Lecturer in Law, University College of London, for
bringing this point to my attention.
130. United States v. Von Weizsäcker ("The Ministries Case"), 14 T.W.C., at 850-51 (1950).
131. W. at851.
132. /i/. at 852.
476 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA W [Vol. 30:2
C. The Case Against Funk
The case against Walther Funk resulted in a conviction, inter alia, for loans
to the SS that furthered slave labor. Funk had been the Minister of Economics
and also the President of the German Reichsbank. The findings of the
Nuremberg Tribunal that resulted in Funk's conviction were based on several
grounds. He was found guilty of having "entered into an agreement with
Himmler under which the Reichsbank was to receive certain gold and jewels and
currency from the SS and instmcted his subordinates, who were to work out the
details, not to ask too many questions." Based on this agreement, the
Reichsbank received objects stolen from persons who had been exterminated in
the concentration camps, including money, jewelry, watches, and gold from
eyeglasses, teeth, and fillings. In addition to these activities that clearly went
beyond the ordinary tasks of a politician and banker:
As Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank, Funk participated in
the economic exploitation of occupied territories . . . As President of the
Reichsbank, Funk was also indirectly involved in the utilization of concentration
camp labor. Under his direction the Reichsbank set up a revolving ñind of
12,000,000 Reichsmarks to the credit of the SS for the construction of factories to
use concentration camp laborers.
Without further discussion, the Tribunal concluded that while it did not find
Funk to be guilty on coimt one (crimes against peace), they regarded him guilty
under counts two, three, and four (war crimes and crimes against humanity in
various respects).'-''' Given the lack of analysis on the part of the Tribunal, it is
not clear what role the loan for concentration camp labor played in reaching a
guilty verdict. While, therefore, it is not possible to conclude with certainty that
the loan in itself would have resulted in Funk's conviction, it was clearly one
factor the Tribunal regarded as important. Thus, the decision demonstrates that
making loans might give rise to criminal responsibility for aiding and abetting
under intemational law.
D. The Case Against Flick
Finally, in the Flick case,'^^ two industrials, Friedrich Flick and Otto
Steinbrinck, were held criminally liable because they had contributed funds to
the SS with knowledge of the crimes committed by that organization. The
Tribunal first stated that an organization like the SS that commits war crimes
and crimes against humanity on a large scale could be nothing other than
133. United States V. Brandt ("The Medical Case"), 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 [T.W.C], at 171, 305-
06 (Nuernberg Military Tribs. 1949).
134. W. at 307.
135. United States v. Flick ("The Flick Case"), 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 [T.W.C], at 1217-23
(Nuernberg Military Tribs. 1952).
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criminal.'^^ It continued that, "One who knowingly by his influence and money
confributes to the support thereof must, under settled legal principles, be deemed
to be, if not a principal, certainly an accessory to such crimes."'^^ The Tribunal
went on to emphasize that:
It remains clear from the evidence that each of them gave to Himmler, the Reich
Leader SS, a blank check. His criminal organization was maintained and we have
no doubt that some of this money went to its maintenance. It seems to be
immaterial whether it was spent on salaries or for lethal gas. So we are compelled
to find fi-om the evidence that both defendants are guilty on count four. '^^
Thus, they were convicted even though the prosecution could not show that
any part of the money donated by either of them was directly used for criminal
activities of the SS. This is an interesting approach to one of the most complex
issues in the eontext of liability for providing fluids, that is, whether liability
requires establishing a link between a particular loan or donation and specific
violations committed by the recipient. Just as the Tribunal hinted in Rasche, in
the context of financing, it is not necessary to show that the specific
contributions made by individual defendants were intended for unlawftil
purposes. Rather, it is sufficient that some part of the receiving fund had such an
intended use.'-'^ Funding that goes toward an organization with such clearly
criminal purposes and characteristics as the SS must be regarded as confributing
to maintaining it, eliminating the need to examine the exact use of the funds
provided.
While mens rea is not specifically discussed in the Flick decision, it seems
as if, unlike in the Rasche case, the Tribunal infers knowledge of the unlawful
use that would be made of the money from the nature of the SS and the ftind
made available to Himmler.'^ *^ In Rasche, on the other hand, equally with regard
to confributions made to Himmler, the Tribunal failed to find that the character
136. M at 1217.
137. Id
138. W. at 1221.
139. But see Christoph Burchard, Ancillary and Neutral Business Contributions to 'Corporate-
Political Core Crime', 8 J. iNT. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 919, 936-37 (2010), who suggests that the
liability of the defendants in the Flick case rests exclusively on their membership in a criminal
organization, the SS, and does therefore not provide any guidance as to the standards that apply with
regard to liability as an accessory to the crime. However, given that the indictment under count four
was based on the fact that they were "accessories to, abetted, took a consenting part in, were
connected with plans and enterprises involving, and were members of organizations or groups
connected with: murders . . . " United States v. Flick ("The Flick Case"), 6 T.W.C., at 1223 (1952),
and that the Tribunal finds them guilty on that count, concluding that they were accessories to the
crimes committed by the SS, it is difficult to share Burchard's unequivocal conclusion in this
respect, even though the Tribunal refers to their liability only in terms of their membership in the SS.
United States v. Flick ("The Flick Case"), 6 T.W.C., at 1216-17 (1952).
140. United States v. Flick ("The Flick Case"), 6 T.W.C., at 1217 (1952) ("An organization
which on a large scale is responsible for such crimes can be nothing else than criminal. One who
knowingly by his influence and money contributes to the support thereof must, under settled legal
principles, be deemed to be, if not a principal, certainly an accessory to such crimes").
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of the recipient individual and organization implied that the lender had
knowledge of the illegitimate ptirposes for the fiinds.''*'
E. Conclusions
Prior to the trials discussed above, OMGUS issued reports on the war
crimes of Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank'"*^ that highlighted the important
role of private banks and of particular bankers, including Rasche,'^-' in
preparing the German economy for the war.'^'* In addition to analyzing many
other activities carried out or coordinated by these banks, the report stressed the
essential frinctions of bank loans for the criminal policies of the Nazi regime
generally, as well as for supporting the war, in particular. ''*^ It is striking that the
findings of the OMGUS Reports were not considered in the Nuremberg
Tribunal's discussions conceming complicity liabilify for individual financial
officers.
I. How to Interpret the Nuremberg Case Law
Any attempt to interpret the holdings in the different cases discussed above
and to reconcile their disparate outcomes with regard to loans has to take
account of the fact that the Nuremberg Tribunals did not provide detailed legal
justifications of all parts of their decisions. Consequently, it is not always clear
what the decisive features were that sufficiently distinguished the various
scenarios and resulted in their different outcomes. This makes it difficult to draw
from the decisions precise and coherent principles with regard to the question of
whether and under what circumstances lending in general, and commercial
lending in particular, might give rise to aiding and abetting liabilify. There is, for
example, no indication in the case law as to the importance, if any, that might
have been attached to the fact that Rasche was a private banker while Funk was
the president of the Reichsbank, a bank owned and controlled by the state, and
an important member of the Nazi government, and Puhl the depufy president of
the Reichsbank.
It is equally unclear to what extent the difference in outcomes in Flick and
Rasche rests on the fact that Flick was accused of making personal financial
contributions to Himmler in order to secure political favors, whereas Rasche was
accused of making a commercial loan on behalf of Dresdner Bank. For the Court
in Doe V Nestle, this was indeed the decisive difference between the two
141. See discussion supra Section III(A).
142. Christopher Simpson, supra note 106.
143. W. at 396.
144. Id at 105-24.
145. Id at 38-40.
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*^  It explained Rasche's acquittal and Flick's convicdon by an inference
from Nuremberg cases that "[w]hen a business engages in a commercial quid
pro quo-foT example, by making a loan to a third party-it is insufficient to show
merely that the business person knows that the fransaction will somehow
facilitate the third party's uTongful acts."'''^ Liabilify would, on the other hand,
be the consequence where the business acts "in a non-commercial, non-
mutually-beneficial manner, as with the banker in The Flick Case who
gratuitously ftinded the SS's criminal activities . . . or the chemical-company
employees in the Zyklon B Case who provided the gas, tools, and specific
training that facilitated the Germans' genocidal acts."'''^ According to the Court,
"[r]egardless of whether the holdings are categorized as turning on the
defendant's actus reus or the mens rea, the ultimate conclusion is clear: ordinary
commercial fransacdon[s], without more, do not violate intemadonal law."'''^
The analysis raises several problems. First of all, while a financial donation
like that made by Flick can easily be categorized as both non-commercial and
non-mutually-beneficial, it is not obvious why the Court identified the Zyklon B
case as one in which the business person acted in a "non-commercial, non-
mutually-beneficial manner." Tesch produced and sold poisonous gas and
provided training regarding its use for killing concentration camp inmates,
which he did as a profitable business fransaction. The fact that these are clearly
reprehensible actions does not deprive them of their commercial nature.
More importantly, the conclusion that "ordinary commercial transaction[s],
without more, do not violate intemational law"'^*' does not extend very far.'^'
The interesting question is, rather, that of determining what exactly is this
"more" that would tum a commercial transaction into a violation of international
law. Despite the contrary suggestion of the Court in Doe v. Nestle, it is essential
to distill whether these holdings tum on the actus reus or the mens rea of aiding
and abetting liability. If they were based on the actus reus, then "more" would
presumably have to embody an activity that goes beyond making a mere
commercial transaction. In a mens rea based interpretation, on the other hand,
"more" would be the mental element with which the commercial transaction was
carried out.
The problems with glossing over the Nuremberg cases' distinction between
actus reus and mens rea become apparent in the Nestle court's comparison of
146. Doe V. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1089-90, 1094-96 (CD. Cal. 2010).
147. W. at 1094.
148. Id at 1095.
149. Id at 1090.
150. Id
151. See also the discussion of US case law on criminal conspiracy and aiding and abetting
liability in the context of commercial transactions, supra Section II(C)(5).; See also United States v.
Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283,285-86 (7th Cir. 1992) (author's emphasis).
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the Farben^^^ and Zyklon B^^^ cases.'^^ In both cases, industrialists were
accused of supplying the Nazis with large quantities of the poison gas Zyklon B
that was used to exterminate concentration camp members. In the Farben case,
the defendants were acquitted, whereas the Zyklon B case resulted in a
conviction. The Court in Doe v. Nestle suggested that the different outcomes rest
on the distinction that, "[i]n one case, the defendants had provided the tools and
the training on using those tools for illegal purposes; in the other case, the
defendants provided only the tools and were unaware of the illegal acts being
done."'^^ As the quote itself demonstrates, there were differences both on the
actus reus and the mens rea side. In Zyklon B, the industrialists had gone beyond
supplying the gas; in Farben the relevant mens rea could moreover not be
established. Indeed, the acquittal in the Farben case seems to have rested
entirely on a lack of mens rea, ' ^^  while the consideration of whether or not the
actus reus consisted solely in a commercial transaction does not seem to have
had any relevance for the outcome. It is, in fact, highly unlikely that, had the
relevant mens rea with regard to the intended use of the poison gas by the Nazis
been established, the Court would have acquitted the defendants on the basis
that this was no more than a commercial transaction.
In Zyklon B, on the other hand, the defendants' mens rea could be
demonsfrated.'^^ Thus, the "more" in the Zyklon B case that was missing in the
Farben case was the presence of the requisite mens rea, which explains the
acquittal in one case and the conviction in the other. A clear distinction between
the actus reus and mens rea elements of complicity liabilify is tbus essential to
understand the different outcomes in these two cases, rather than the
commercial/non-commercial nature of the transaction. This is not to say that the
fact that the defendants in the Zyklon B case participated more closely in the
killings than those in Farben has no relevance, as this deepened participation
made it easier to infer the necessary mens rea in the Zyklon B case.
152. United States v. Krauch ("The l.G. Farben Case"), 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 [T.W.C.], at 1169
(Nuemberg Military Tribs. 1953).
153. U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, LAW REP. OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS (Vol. 1), Case. No.
9, The Zyklon B Case, The Trial of Bmno Tesch and Two Others, at 93-103 (1947).
154. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1090-91.
155. W. at 1091.
156. United States v. Krauch ("The l.G. Farben Case"), 8 T.W.C. at 1169 (1953) ("The proof is
quite convincing that large quantities of Cyelon—B were supplied to the SS by Degesch and that it
was used in the mass extermination of inmates of concentration camps, including Auschwitz. But
neither the volume of production nor the fact that large shipments were destined to concentration
camps would alone be sufficient to lead us to conclude that those who knew of sueh facts must also
have had knowledge of the criminal purposes to whieh this substance was being put. Any such
conclusion is refuted by the well-known need for insecticides wherever large numbers of displaced
persons, brought in fi-om widely seattered regions, are confined in congested quarters lacking
adequate sanitary facilities").
157. "The Zyklon B Case", supra note 51, at 102.
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The conviction of Funk was in part based on the accusation that he made
funding available to the SS for the construction of factories to use concentration
camp inmates as slave laborers.'^^ The far-reaching approach to responsibility
for financing activities that was adopted in the Flick case equally demonsfrates
that a sufficient link between funding and gross violations of intemational law
can exist. ^ ^ The discussion of Rasche's liability under count seven implies that
commercial loans can result in responsibility for aiding and abetting.'^'' Thus, a
closer look at Nuremberg case law does not support the categorical rejection of
liability for financing activities in general and commercial loans in particular, as
suggested by the Court in South African Apartheid Litigation based on its
reading of the Rasche decision under count five.'^'
When assessing what lessons can be leamed from Nuremberg for corporate
complicity cases before US courts, one cannot overlook that the Nuremberg
friáis dealt with the liability of individuals, not corporations. Consequently, the
prosecution in each case needed to establish that the individual who stood trial
had acted in a way that justified criminal conviction: It was insufficient to
attribute responsibility directly to the relevant corporations.'^^ The IG Farben
Case makes the relevance of this distinction particularly clear. There, the
Tribunal explained that the individual's responsibility for corporate actions
requires proof that "an individual defendant was either a participant in the illegal
act or that, being aware thereof, he authorized or approved it.'^^
The position of the individual defendants within the corporation, including
their decision-making authority and individual contributions in the context of the
relevant fransactions, were, accordingly, a crucial factor for establishing
liability. The Tribunal found that Funk exercised a sufficientiy influential
position to be held personally criminally liable for the loans he authorized;
whereas Puhl, although also holding a position of authority, did not play a
158. United States v. Brandt ("The Medical Case"), 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 [T.W.C], at 305-06
(Nuertiberg Military Tribs. 1949).
159. United States v. Flick ("The Flick Case"), 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 [T.W.C], at 1217-23
(Nuemberg Military Tribs. 1952).
160. United States v. Von Weizsäcker ("The Ministries Case"), 14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 [T.W.C],
at 853-55 (Nuemberg Military Tribs. 1950).
161. In re South Afiican Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
162. Florian Jessberger, On the Origins of Individual Criminal Responsibility under
International Law for Business Activity, 8 J. INT. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 783, 794-95 (2010) (suggesting
in this respect that "[hjere, an issue which concems the practice of intemational criminal law to this
day becomes obvious: the difficulty of attributing a crime to a certain person as a (factual) problem
of proof, not one of law").
163. United States v. Krauch ("The I.G. Farben Case"), 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 [T.W.C], at 1153
(Nuemberg Military Tribs. 1953).
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decisive role and the Tribunal acquitted him of the charges related to securing
the loans. The same findings led the Tribunal to the acquittal of Rasche under
count seven. Thus, it seems that whether or not funding activities gave rise to
liability depended, at least in part, on the role played by the individual in
initiating or granting the loan.
The focus on individual as opposed to corporate responsibility is clearly an
important difference between Nuremberg case law and that of US courts on the
liability of corporations under the ATCA. In the latter, no individual
responsibility of members of the corporation needs to be shown.'^^ Thus, even
to the extent that Nuremberg case law, in particular the acquittal of Rasche on
count five, is interpreted in the way suggested in South African Apartheid
Litigation, it would not automatically follow that corporate responsibility for
similar activities would also have to be declined. This would only be the case if
it could be shown that the reasons for which individual liability was rejected by
the Nuremberg fribunals similarly apply to corporate liability. Where the
Nuremberg cases found that there was no liability due to the individual
defendant's role within a corporation, a US court analyzing corporate liability
under the ATCA is not similarly precluded. Moreover, liability under the ATCA
might be easier to demonstrate given the lesser burden of proof in civil as
opposed to criminal cases.
2. Developments in International Law Since Nuremberg
Although Nuremberg may be one source of persuasive authority for US
courts analyzing ATCA claims, intemational law has flirther developed in the
area of complicity liability since those decisions were handed down. The
intemational legal discourse has increasingly taken up the issue of corporate
complicity liability, in general,'^* and legal discotirse has started denouncing
companies that finance human rights abuses. '^^ Had the Court in South African
Apartheid Litigation taken account of the intemational legal discourse after
Nuremberg, it might have reached a more nuanced decision regarding whether
commercial activities, including loans, can be sufficiently linked to gross human
rights violations to give rise to eomplicity liability.
164. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Flomo v. Firestone Natural
Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F. 2d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, Nos. 02-56256, 02-
56390, 09-56381, 2011 WL 5041927 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2011); But see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting the existence of corporate liability for aiding
and abetting under the ATCA).
165. See, e.g., Int'l Comm'n of Jurists, supra note 1, Vol, 2: Criminal Law and International
Crimes (2008), Vol, 3: Civil Remedies, See also Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From
Nuremberg to Rangoon, An Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of
Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 91, 100, 113-14, 158-59 (2002) (arguing that
the Rasche decision is outdated in that intemational criminal law and accomplice liability have since
developed); Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Veerle Opgenhaffen, supra note 4 at 174.
166. Shaw W. Scott, supra note 4 at 1533-34.
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The Intemational Commission of Jurists, for example, argues that:
[If corporate ofñcials] have the necessary knowledge as to the impact of their
actions, it is irrelevant that they only intended to carry out normal business
activities. For example, vendors who sell goods or materials . . . can be
responsible as accomplices if they have knowledge, judged objectively, that the
purchaser would use them to commit crimes under intemational law. '^'
Awareness of the link between financing and violations of intemational law
is also increasing.'^^ In this respect, the Intemational Commission of Jurists
suggests that "criminal liability of a financier will depend on what he or she
knows about how his or her services and loans will be utilized and the degree to
which these services actually affect the commission of a crime. "'^^ Others speak
of a "trend towards criminalizing the 'ordinary' financing and furthering of
intemational treaty crimes,"'^*' and they emphasize the general recognition that
it is necessary "to prevent the commission of intemational crimes from the very
outset by drying up their financial and material fotmdations."'^'
However, international law has not given the same attention to financing
gross violations of human rights as financing has received in other areas, such as
anti-cormption, organized crime, and terrorism. ' ^^  It is therefore necessary to
address the extent to which legal principles and standards developed in these
contexts can be generalized and applied to the question of liabilify for funding
gross human rights violations. In particular, US case law on funding terrorism
raises helpfiil similarities and differences that may reveal potential arguments in
the ATCA context of frinding gross human rights violations committed by
governments.
167. Int'l Comm'n of Jurists, supra note 1, Vol. 2 at 22 (in the context of mens rea).
168. See, e.g., Anita Ramasastry (1998), supra note 4; Shaw W. Scott, supra note 4; Juan Pablo
Bohoslavsky & Veerle Opgenhaffen, supra note 4; Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Mariana Rulli, supra
note 4.
169. Int'l Comm'n of Jurists, supra note 1, Vol. 2 at 39-40.
170. Christoph Burchard, supra note 139 at 931.
171. Id.
172. Indeed, when suggesting that intemational law has developed in the context of complicity
for financing, Shaw W. Scott, supra note 4 at 1533-34, makes reference to general developments in
the context of intemational codes of conduct for transnational corporations, but more specifically to
those in the context of money-laundering and funding of terrorist activities, and also to the UN
Intemational Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Christoph Burchard,
supra note 139 at 931, similarly refers to the UN Intemational Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism. See also INÉS TÓFALO, Overt and Hidden Accomplices: Transnational
Corporations' Range of Complicity for Human Rights Violations, in TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 335, 345-46 (Olivier De Schutter ed.. Hart 2006) (refers to
anti-terrorist funding laws and U.N. Security Council Resolutions on asset freezing for such
funding).
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IV.
LESSONS FROM LEGAL APPROACHES TO FUNDING TERRORISM
In the context of the fight against terrorism, more and more attention has
been paid to the primary importance of tackling the funding made available to
terrorists. The Intemational Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism,'^-' which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1999, stresses
in its preamble "that the financing of terrorism is a matter of grave concem to
the intemational communify as a whole" and "that the number and seriousness
of acts of international terrorism depend on the financing that terrorists may
obtain."
In the United States, the US Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) makes it a criminal
offense to provide material support or resources, knowing or intending that they
are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, violations of certain laws.'^'*
The legislative definition of "material support or resources" includes currency,
monetary instruments, financial securities, and financial services.'^^ The statute
prohibits providing, attempting to provide, or conspiring to provide material
support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations, thus expressly
criminalizing the act of flinding or providing other financial services to such
organizations.'^^ Organizations can be designated as a foreign terrorist
organization (FTO) if they are engaged in terrorist activify or terrorism that
threatens "the security of United States nationals or the nadonal security
[national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests] of the United
States."'^^ The ATA provides criminal and civil penalties for whomever, "by
any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully provides or collects
frinds with the intention that such frinds be used, or knowledge that such funds
are to be used" in order to carry out a terrorist act.'^^ Finally, Section 2333
provides US nationals who were injured by an act of intemational terrorism with
the civil remedy of triple damages.
This shows that with respect to funding terrorism, legislators regard money
as a particularly dangerous agent, and far-reaching liability is especially created
to tackle the financiers of terrorists and terrorism. This stands in stark confrast to
the approach in South African Apartheid Litigation, where the Court considered
money to be an innocent agent that was always too far removed from the
173. G.A. Res 54/109, UN. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999).
174. 18 U.S.C. §2339A (2009).
175. 18 U.S.C. §2339A(b)(l) (2009).
176. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2009); See also Nina Crimm, High Alert: The Government's War on
the Financing of Terrorism and its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations,
and Global Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341 (2004) (detailed discussion of U.S. Anti-
Terrorism legislation).
177. 8 U.S.C. § 1 l89(a)(l)(C) (2006) (emphasis added).
178. 18 U.S.C. §2339C (2009).
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violations carried out to give rise to complicity liabilify. '^^
This dichotomy can be explained in part by the significant factual and legal
differences between funding terrorism and providing loans to regimes that
commit gross human rights violations. An analysis of the approach adopted in
US cases in which victims of terrorist attacks file lawsuits against banks is
nevertheless interesting as it can provide a different view of the link between
financing and gross intemational law violations. Indeed, some of the legal issues
arising in those cases are very similar to those the Court had to address in South
African Apartheid Litigation. First, both types of cases involve what defendants
allege is no more than routine commercial provision of banking services.
Second, both cases raise the same basic questions about how to define liability
given the fungibilify of money and the difficulty with linking individual
financial contributions to specific harmful acts. While most of the cases arising
in the terrorism context are argued under the ATA, some are argued under the
ATCA and are based on the same legal principles that are applicable in
complicify cases for funding gross human rights violations.
A. Relevance of the Routine Nature of Banking Activities
Several of the US terrorism-related cases dealt with the question of whether
providing commercial banking services can give rise to liability for the crimes
committed by their recipients. However, unlike South African Apartheid
Litigation, in the terrorism context, the question was not limited to the particular
issue of bank loans, but extended to banking services more broadly.
In one case, Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. and Development Corp., '^ '^  victims
of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 sued individuals and entities,
including banks and charitable foundations, for funding and supporting Al
Qaeda. The complaint included allegations against Al Rajhi, a Saudi Arabian
banking and investment corporation. The plaintiffs' main allegation was that Al
Rajhi was the primary bank for a number of charities that serve as Al Qaeda
front groups and that "funnel terrorism financing and support"'^' through Al-
Rajhi's financial system. The Court held that Al Rajhi was not liable because he
was merely a conduit of funds.
The act of providing material support to terrorists, or "frinneling" money
through banks for terrorists is unlawful and actionable, but . . . Al Rajhi is
alleged only to be the funnel. Plaintiffs offer no support, and we have found
none, for the proposition that a bank is liable for injuries done with money that
passes through its hands in the form of deposits, withdrawals, check clearing
179. In re South AfiHcan Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); See also
Doe V. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (CD. Cal. 2010).
180. Bumett v. Al Baraka Inv. and Dev't Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2003).
181. W. at 109.
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services, or any other routine banking service. ' ^ ^
This sounds as if routine commercial activities, which as such are not
forbidden, can never form the actus reus of liability on the part of banks.
However, other decisions cast doubt on this interpretation. In In Re Terrorist
Attacks on September 11, 2001,^^^ victims of the attacks sued entities that
allegedly provided assistance to Al Qaeda. The Court considered defendant
bank's knowledge of how its services were being used and held that "there can
be no bank liability for injuries caused by money routinely passing through the
bank. Saudi American Bank is not alleged to have known that anything relating
to terrorism was occurring through the services it provided."' Thus, the Court
indicated that liability may have been available had the bank had knowledge that
their services were being used for terrorism purposes. This suggests that an
important factor for the Court was the bank's lack of mens rea, rather than the
absence of an actus reus. While this statement was made in the context of
deciding whether the provision of routine banking services can amount to
material support to a terrorist organization, the Court in the same decision
rejected a claim against Al Rajhi Bank for aiding and abetting tertorists on the
grounds that no allegations were made that the defendant bank knew that the
recipients of the money supported terrorism. The Court did not give any
indication that it would have rejected aiding and abetting liability had the
necessary knowledge been established. ' ^ ^
The decision in Weiss v. National Westminster Bank,^^^ in which victims of
terrorist attacks in Israel brought a claim against National Westminster Bank
(NatWest) for allegedly facilitating the activities of tertorist organizations, lends
support to the interpretation that the decision in In Re Terrorist Attacks on
September II, 2001 rests decisively on the mens rea of the banking defendant.
NatWest argued that the Court should rely on In Re Terrorist Attacks on
September II, 2001^^^ for the proposition that basic banking services, such as
account maintenance, should be excluded from the definition of financial
services in Section 2339(B)(a)(l), the provision of which the bank was
accused.'^^ The Court found the defendant bank liable and clarified that routine
banking services are not per se exempt from liability.
182. Id
183. In re Tertorist Attacks on September 11, 2011, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
184. Id at 834.
185. Id. at 832-33 ("Plaintiffs claim Al Rajhi Bank aided and abetted the September 11
tertorists by donating to certain Defendant charities and acting as the bank for these Defendants.
New York law and the courts interpreting the ATA in Boim make very clear that concerted action
liability requires general knowledge of the primary actor's conduct. Even with the opportunity to
clarify their claims against Al Rajhi Bank, the Bumett Plaintiffs do not offer fac:s to support their
conclusions that Al Rajhi Bank had to know that Defendant charities ... were suppcoting teuorism").
186. Weiss V. Nat'l Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 609 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
187. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2011, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
188. Weiss, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
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The Defendant misconstrued the Terrorist Attacks decision. In holding that
there could be no liability on the basis of "routine banking business" that Court
did not mean that the provision of basic banking services could never give rise
to bank liability. Rather the Court relied on the routine nature of the banking
services to conclude that the defendant bank had no knowledge of the client's
. . . I R Q
terrorist activities.
The faet that the services provided are routine banking services is relevant
for showing the bank may not have suspected that it was providing assistance to
the commission of terrorist acts. Conversely, courts can more easily infer such
knowledge from non-routine banking services that are naturally suspicious. The
relevance of the routine nature of the service thus lies, primarily, in the realm of
determining the relevant mens rea of the defendant. A similar approach was
adopted in Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais. ^ '^'^
In both Strauss and Weiss, the relevant statements were made in the context
of an analysis of liability for providing material support to terrorist
organizations, thus clarifying that making available routine banking services can
amount to the provision of material support as defined in Section 2339A(b)(l).
At the same time, in both cases, the plaintiffs' claims for aiding and abetting
liability for rendering routine banking services were rejected on the grounds that
"[t]he maintenance of a bank account and the receipt or fransfer of funds does
not constitute substantial assistance."'^' The Courts relied on In Re Terrorist
Attacks on September 11, 2001^^-^ as a precedent to support their views in this
respect. However, as seen above, in that case the Court rejected the claim for
aiding and abetting hability on the same grounds as that for the provision of
material support (i.e., because defendants' lacked knowledge for mens rea, not
because of the routine nature of their services).
Goldberg v, UBS is another decision where the Court accepted that routine
banking services might amount to the provision of material support, but did not
give rise to aiding and abetting liability. The Court relied In Re Terrorist Attacks
on September 11, 2001 and the statement in Boim I that ftinding simpUciter
cannot result in civil liability'^^ to support its view that "performing three wire
transfers for ASP [Association de Secours Palestinien] fail[s] to establish
'substantial assistance' of the sort required to support an aiding and abetting
189. Id, at 625; See also In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 718 F. Supp. 2d 456
489 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
190. Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., No. CV-06-0702 (CPS), 2006 WL 2862704, at *12
(E.D.N.Y. October 5, 2006).
191. W. at *9; Weiss, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 621; See also Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d
410,425 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
192. /n/-e Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2011, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
193. Boim V. Quranic Literacy Inst. and Holy Land Found, for Relief and Dev't ("Boim 1"),
291 F. 3d 1000, 1011 (7th Cir. 2002).
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claim."'^^ The relevant part oí Boim I reads as follows:
To say that funding simpliciter constitutes an act of terrorism is to give the statute
[the ATA] an almost unlimited reach. Any act which turns out to facilitate
terrorism, however remote that act may be from actual violence and regardless of
the actor's intent, could be construed to "involve" terrorism . . . [Tjhe complaint
cannot be sustained on the theory that the defendants themselves committed an
act of intemational terrorism when they donated unspecified amounts of money to
Hamas, neither knowing nor suspecting that Hamas would in tum financially
support the persons who murdered David Boim. In the very least, the plaintiffs
must be able to show that murder was a reasonably foreseeable result of making a
donation. Thus, the Boims' first theory of liability under Section 2333, funding
simpliciter of a terrorist organization, is insufficient because it sets too vague a
standard, and because it does not require a showing of proximate cause.
This holding addresses a theory of primary liabilify based on the
assumption that the provision of funding involves violent conduct and
consequently amounts to an act of terrorism and would, therefore, make the
frinder liable as the principal offender. Thus, it is not evident why it would
constitute authority regarding the scope and limits of secondary liability for
aiding and abetting the principal offender. More importantly, the Court does not
seem to be saying that fiinding cannot amotmt to '"substantial assistance' of the
sort required to support an aiding and abetting claim," as suggested by the Cotirt
in Goldberg,^^^ but rather that funding without the necessary mens rea and
without being the proximate cause of the violent acts committed cannot give rise
to liability. Thus, as in In Re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, Boim I
does not lend support to a rejection of aiding and abetting liabilify for certain
banking activities where mens rea as well as proximate cause can be shown.
The role of routine banking services in aiding and abetting liability also lies
at the heart of the decisions in Linde v. Arab Bank^^^ and Almog v. Arab
Bank.^^^ The plaintiffs in both cases made detailed allegations against the
defendant bank, suggesting that it materially supported the efforts and goals of
several terrorist organizations, including Hamas. They alleged mainly two types
of support: (1) providing banking services, including maintaining accounts, for
these organizations; and (2) administering the disfribution of benefits made
available by the Saudi Committee, a committee created in Saudi Arabia to raise
fijnds to support the objectives of the relevant terrorist organizations, to the
families of Palestinian "martyrs" and those wounded or imprisoned in
perpetrating terrorist attacks. '^^
Arab Bank argued that it merely provided routine banking services, a
194. Goldberg, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 425.
195. ßoim/,291 F.3dat 1011-12.
196. Goldberg, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 425.
197. Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
198. Almog V. Arab Bank PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
199. Id at 262-263; Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 576-77.
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defense rejected by the Court in both cases. In Almog, it was argued in this
respect that:
Arab Bank ignores that aets whieh in themselves may be benign, if done for a
benign purpose, may be actionable if done with the knowledge that they are
supporting unlawful acts. Nothing in the amended complaints suggests that Arab
Bank is a mere unknowing conduit for the unlawñil aets of others, about whose
aims the Bank is ignorant. Given plaintiffs' allegations regarding the knowing
and intentional nature of the Bank's activities, there is nothing "routine" about the
services the Bank is alleged to have provided. Thus, plaintiffs' allegations with
respect to Arab Bank's knowledge and conduct are sufficient under their first
factual theory.2°°
Doe V. Nestle^'^^ interprets the outcome in Almog as based on the fact "that
the defendant bank did not 'merely provide . . . routine banking services' that
benefitted the terrorist organization,"^"^ and therefore regards Almog as
supporting Doe's view that "[t]he act of providing financing, without more, does
not satisfy the actus reus requirement of aiding and abetting under intemational
law."^"-' Rather, "some additional assistance beyond financing" is necessary,
such as in Almog, where the bank went beyond holding and transferring ftinds
and "took the extra step of 'solicit[ing] and collect[ing]' those ftrnds for
20'
Similarly, whereas the Court in Goldberg held that routine banking services
might amount to the provision of material support but does not give rise to
aiding and abetting liability, the Linde court held that performing wire transfers
to unlawful organizations could qualify as aiding and abetting the overall
terrorist scheme. The Goldberg court distinguished itself by observing that in
Linde, "the bank was alleged to have acted essentially as the officially
designated administrator for terrorism incentive payments."^"^
However, even though the services provided in Almog and Linde clearly
went beyond the provision of ordinary banking services for the terrorist
organizations concemed, the above quote from Almog referred to the Court's
conclusions with regard to the plaintiffs theory that involved liability for
providing banking services and was not related to the additional activities of
which the bank was accused. The same applies to the Linde quote. In both cases
the discussion confirms the argument that the determinative factor for
200. Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 291; See also Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 588 ("Although the
Bank would like this court to find, as did the court in In re Terrorist Attacks, that it is engaged in
"routine banking serviees," here, given plaintiffs' allegations regarding the knowing and intentional
nature of the Bank's aetivities, there is nothing "routine" about the services the Bank is alleged to
provide").
201. Doe V. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (CD. Cal. 2010).
202. Id at 1097.
203. Id at 1099.
204. Id.; See also. In re Chiquita Brands Int'l, Ine. Alien Tort Statute & S'holder Derivative
Litig., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1339-1340 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
205. Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
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distinguishing harmless routine banking services from those that might result in
liability is the bank's mens rea. It is this knowledge of the purpose for which the
services are being used, and of the unlawful acts they might be facilitating,
which distinguishes routine from non-routine banking services.^ *^^ Under this
interpretation, the fact that a bank only provided routine commercial services
does not automatically exclude the actus reus of liability, nor does the routine
nature of the services stand in the way of establishing a sufficient causal link.
Instead, the nature of the service, whether it is routine and/or commercial, is
primarily relevant for the mens rea question, not the actus reus. It might be
easier to assume knowledge that the banking services facilitate terrorist activities
if the transactions themselves fall outside of the ordinary, than in cases where
routine services are being provided.^"^
The relevant parts of the Almog decision stem from an analysis of the
bank's liabilify under the ATCA,-^ *'^  while the Court in Linde reached a similar
conclusion when examining the issue in the context of a claim under the ATA. It
thus seems fair to assume that the relevant arguments and conclusions are not
based on the specificities of the anti-terrorism legislation but, rather, also apply
to complicity liabilify outside of that specific legislative framework. At least in
the context of funding terrorism,^^^ the routine or commercial nature of
fmancial services does not automatically exclude the actus reus of liabilify for
aiding and abetting. When financial services frirther terrorist acts, liabilify rests
on the mens rea with which the services were provided, not the type of service.
B. Actus Reus and Causation in the Context of Funding Terrorism
As this prior discussion shows, some courts have concluded that defendants
accused of providing "routine" banking services are not automatically shielded
from liabilify. These courts must then determine the relevant liability standards.
In this context, the confrolling statute may determine the standard chosen. As
explained above, when establishing liability for aiding and abetting under the
ATCA, the relevant actus reus standard requires practical assistance that has a
substantial effect on the commission of the violation of the law of nations
carried out by the principal actor.^'*' Where a case is brought under the ATA,
206. For a similar interpretation see Weiss v. Nat'l Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d
609, 624 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
207. 5ee also Wultz v. Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 52-53 (D.D.C. 2010).
208. Almog V. Arab Bank PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (with regard to the
Banks liabilify for aiding and abetting under the ATA, the eourt held that "With respect to aiding and
abetting liabilify, the financial services provided by Arab Bank, and the administration of the benefit
plan, are alleged to have provided substantial assistance to intemational terrorism and encouraged
terrorists to act . . . . Thus, Arab Bank's alleged conduct is a sufficient basis for liabilify under the
broad scope of the ATA").
209. W. at 291.
210. Seera/jra section I1(C)(1).
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the relevant standard depends on the exact provision on which the claim is
based.
In many of the terrorism cases that involved the provision of banking
services and/or funds, the plaintiffs rely on several provisions of the ATA
simultaneously. In most cases, it is alleged that the banks or flinders violated the
prohibitions to provide material support under Sections 2339A, 2339B, and
2339C, and that this gives rise to civil liability pursuant to Section 2333.^" At
least in one case, plaintiffs argued that funding the commission of terrorist
attacks amounts on its own to an act involving terrorism that creates primary
liability under Section 2333.^'^ To the extent that the claims allege aiding and
abetting liability, '-^  they usually argue that such liability arises out of assisting
one of the acts listed in Section 2332, which includes murder, attempted murder,
and serious bodily injury. Where aiding and abetting liability is at issue, courts
seem to apply a substantial assistance standard.^'''
When interpreting the meaning of material support in the context of the
ATA, courts emphasized that the term "relates to the type of aid provided rather
than whether it is substantial or considerable."^'^ Support under Section 2339A
is therefore automatically regarded as material, regardless of its intensity or
effect. In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the US Supreme Court
explained: "Material support is a valuable resource by definition. Such support
frees up other resources within the organization that may be put to violent
ends."^'^ Justice Breyer,^'^ in line with the majority view on this point,
suggested that where the alleged support consisted in the provision of financial
services, there is a presumption that such support has a significant likelihood of
furthering tertorism, as "[t]hose kinds of aid are inherently more likely to help
an organization's terrorist activities, either directly or because they are fungible
211. See. e.g., Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Strauss v. Credit
Lyonnais, S.A., No. CV-06-0702 (CPS), 2006 WL 2862704 (E.D.N.Y. October 5, 2006); Weiss v.
Nat'l Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 609 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
212. Boim V. Quranic Literacy Inst. and Holy Land Found, for Relief and Dev't ("Boim 1"),
291 F. 3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002).
213. Courts' views are divided as to whether liability under the ATA is primary or secondary
liability. Boim v. Holy Land Found, for Relief and Dev't ("Boim III"), 549 F. 3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008)
and Goldberg, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410 adopt a primary liability approach, while other courts recognize
aiding and abetting liability under the ATCA. See, e.g.. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11,
2011, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571
(E.D.N.Y. 2005); see also Wultz v. Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2010).
214. See, for example. Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 574.
215. So/m/, 291 F.3dat 1015.
216. Holder V. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725 (2010).
217. Id. al 2741 (Breyer, J., dissenting that where support consisted of mere speech or
association, to provide material support should be understood to require that the flinder knows that
"his support bears a significant likelihood of furthering the organization's tertorist . . . not just its
lawful, aims").
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in nature."^'^
One of the main reasons for this broad approach to liability is the criminal
nature of the organizations the money goes to, as well as that of their activities.
Indeed, the very fact that an organization is designated as a foreign terrorist
organization (FTO)—and many of the US cases refer to funding made available
to FTOs—means that "the specified organizations 'are so tainted by their
criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that
conduct.'"^'^ It is thus assumed that ftinding that goes to an FTO ftirthers
terrorist activities, and the designation of the organization "[p]uts a donor on
notice that the recipient is likely to use the material support for illegal purposes
-or, more generally, that the material support will always free up resources for
the FTO to commit its unlawful acts."^^**
All of this seems to suggest that the mere act of providing material support
to terrorist organizations in the form of ftinding might give rise to liability. This
was the conclusion of the Seventh Circuit in Boim III in an en bane rehearing.^^'
Gunmen allegedly acting on behalf of Hamas killed a US citizen in Israel. His
parents sued various individuals and groups with connections to terrorist
organizations, including charities, for having provided financial support to
Hamas. The case was brought under the legal framework of the ATA.^^^ As
Section 2339B had not been enacted at the time the attack was carried out, the
Court derived liability from a "chain of incorporations by reference (section
2333(a) to section 2331(1) to section 2339A to section 2332)."'^^ One of the
main issues in the Boim litigation was whether it was necessary to show a causal
link between the donations made by the defendants and the death of David
Boim. If so, how could this be achieved, given the fungibility of money? In
particular, how close did the defendants have to be to the commission of the
terrorist offense?
Judge Posner delivered the majority opinion in Boim III, explaining that the
civil remedies provided in Section 2333 are important because "[d]amages are a
less effective remedy against terrorists and their organizations than against their
financial angels"^^^ and "suits against financiers of terrorism can cut the
218. Id
219. See, e.g.. Id, at 2712 (citing Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (note on Findings and Purpose)).
220. Benjamin Yaster, Resetting Scales: An Examination of Due Process Rights in Material
Support Prosecutions, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1353, 1382 (2018); See also Tom Stacy, The "Material
Support" Offence: The Use of Strict Liability in the War Against Terror, 14 KANSAS J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 461, 462-63 (2005).
221. Boim V. Holy Und Found, for Relief and Dev't ("Boim 111"), 549 F. 3d 685 (7th Cir.
2008).
222. Id at 688.
223. Id, at 690.
224. Id
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terrorists' lifeline."^^^ He therefore characterized the availabilify of civil
remedies as "a counterterrorism measure."^^^ He then suggested that an act that
in itself would be too slight to warrant a finding that it had caused the harm
suffered by the victim might become "wrongful because it is done in the context
of what others are doing,"^^^ that it would be sufficient to establish that there
was a substantial probabilify that the defendant's act had caused the harm,^^^
and that a defendant can be held liable:
even though there was no proven, or even likely, causal connection between
an)4hing he did and the injury. It was enough to make him liable that he had
helped to create a danger; it was immaterial that the effect of his help could not be
determined-that his acts could not be found to be either a necessary or a sufficient
condition of the i n j ^ ^ ^
The majorify then applied its general considerations on causation to the case
before it and invited to consider:
an organization solely involved in committing terrorist acts and a hundred people
all of whom know the character of the organization and each of whom contributes
$1,000 to it, for a total of $100,000. The organization has additional resources
from other, unknown contributors of $200,000 and it uses its total resources of
$300,000 to recruit, train, equip, and deploy terrorists who commit a variety of
terrorist acts one of which kills an American citizen. His estate brings a suit under
section 2333 against one of the knowing contributors of $1,000. The tort
principles that we have reviewed would make the defendant jointly and severally
liable with all those other contributors. The fact that the death could not be traced
to any of the contributors . . . would be irrelevant. The knowing contributors as a
whole would have significantly enhanced the risk of terrorist acts . . . and this
would be true even if Hamas had incurred a cost of more than $1,000 to kill the
American, so tbat no defendant's contribution was a sufficient condition of his
230
This seems to relieve the plaintiffs of any btirden to show causation and, in fact,
seems to hold financial donors to a terrorist organization liable for all harm
inflicted by it, however minor their donations, and without a requirement to
establish that the funding in any way facilitated the occurrence of the particular
harm for which the plaintiffs seek relief •^^ '
While this approach to interpreting material support seems consistent with
Humanitarian Law Project, most civil courts tend to insist on a proximate cause
requirement in the context of civil litigation, and they continue to do so in the
225. W. at 691.
226. Id
227. Id. at 696-97 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 52, at 354 (5th ed. 1984)).
228. Id at 697.
229. Id. at 697 (referring to Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397 (Okla. 1958)).
230. Id
231. See also Boim III, 549 F.3d at 706 (Rovner, J., dissenting) and 719 (Wood, J., dissenting).
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aftermath of both Boim III and Humanitarian Law Project?^^ Indeed, cases
analyzing the implications of the Supreme Court decision in Humanitarian Law
Project for civil liability in the context of funding terrorism made it clear that by
the act of providing material support in and of itself does not frigger civil
remedies, but rather only if the material support was the proximate cause for the
injuries suffered by the plaintiffs. In Rothstein, after the Court of Appeals
remanded the action based on the decision in Humanitarian Law Project, the
Court held that:
Humanitarian Law Project does not address Seetion 2333(a)'s proximate
causation requirement. Section 2333 is a remedial civil statute that provides
eompensation to victims who demonstrate they were injured "by reason of an act
of intemational terrorism. As such, establishing a proximate causal relationship
between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs injuries is an indispensable
element of a Seetion 2333(a) civil damages claim. By contrast. Section 2339 is a
purely criminal measure that has no causation element . . . and all that is needed
to sustain a Seetion 2339B prosecution is proof that the defendant knowingly
engaged in prohibited conduct. Accordingly, any potential connection between
Humanitarian Law Project's analysis of Seetion 2339B and this Court's analysis
of Section 2333's proximate causation element would appear to be strained at
best and more likely irrelevant.-^ -'^
Thus, in cases where civil liabilify under Section 2333 for providing material
support is at issue, the requirement that the plaintiff was injured "by reason" of
an act of intemational terrorism makes it necessary causation, particularly
proximate cause, in order to link the defendant to the plaintiffs injury.
In the context of ATA litigation, most courts require for proximate cause
that "defendant's actions were 'a substantial factor in the sequence of
responsible causation,' and that the injury was 'reasonably foreseeable or
anticipated as a natural consequence.'"^^'' This standard closely resembles
substantial effect, but applies here in material support cases alleging civil
responsibilify. Although there are differences between funding terrorism and
funding gross human rights violations, an analysis of how these cases approach
proximate causation might then shed light on the question of whether, under
certain circumstances, funding can have a substantial effect on the violations
carried out by its recipient. This would run contrary to the decision in South
African Apartheid Litigation that "supplying a violator of the law of nations with
funds-even ftinds that could not have been obtained but for those loans-is not
sufficiently connected to the primary violation to fulfill the actus reus
requirement of aiding and abetting a violation of the law ^'^
232. See, e.g., Rothstein v. UBS AG, 772 F. Supp. 2d 511, 513-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Wultz v.
Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 53 (D.D.C. 2010); for a discussion see Abecassis v. Wyati, 785 F. Supp. 2d
614, 633-34, 646 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
233. Rothstein, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 516; See also Abecassis, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 633-34.
234. Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., No. CV-06-0702 (CPS), 2006 WL 2862704, at '17
(E.D.N.Y. October 5, 2006).
235. In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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The issue of what causal link must be shown between the funding by the
defendants and the offenses committed in civil claims for providing material
support to terrorist organizations was discussed in some detail in Goldberg v
UBSP^ Weiss V National Westminster Bank,^^'' and Strauss v Credit
Lyonnais?^^ In Goldberg, the relatives of a victim of a terrorist attack in Israel
sued UBS for having made wire transfers to ASP, an institution that was part of
Hamas' financial infrastructure.^-'^ With regard to the question of proximate
cause, the Court argued that it was sufficient that the plaintiffs had alleged:
[T]he defendant transferred funds fi-om a designated terrorist organization, ASP,
to Tulkarem Zakat, an organization controlled by Hamas in the West Bank
territory, . . . [had] identified three specific transfers to Tulkarem Zakat, the last
of which occurred a few weeks before the terrorist bombing that killed Stuart
Seott Goldberg . . . [and] that Hamas, an organization claimed to control
Tulkarem Zakat, was responsible for the bombing of Bus \9?'^^
The Court also interpreted the ATA as expressing congressional intent to find
companies liable for financial support, although money is always fringible and
causation may be impossible to demonstrate:
Common sense requires a conclusion that Congress did not intend to limit
recovery to those plaintiffs who could show that the very dollars sent to a terrorist
organization were used to purchase the implements of violence that caused harm
to the plaintiff. Sueh a burden would render the statute powerless to stop the flow
of money to intemational terrorists, and would be incompatible with the
legislative history of the ATA.^'"
Weiss V. National Westminster Bank, a case in which victims of terrorist
attacks in Israel brought a claim against National Westminster Bank (NatWest)
for facilitating the activities of terrorist organizations, also addressed the issue of
proximate causation. ^''^ NatWest had argued that in order to succeed with their
claim, "plaintiffs must allege, for example, that the frinds supplied by the
defendant were used to buy the specific weapons and train the specific men who
killed or injured the plaintiffs."^''^ The Court disagreed, suggesting that to prove
proximate cause, it would be sufficient to asseri, as the plaintiffs did, that
NatWest reasonably foresaw that "funds provided directly to known terrorist
groups would be used to perpeti-ate terrorist attacks." '^*'* The Court justified its
conclusion by looking to legislative history as well as to Congress' intent to
236. Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
237. Weiss v. Nat'l Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 609 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
238. Strauss, 2006 WL 2862704.
239. Goldberg, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 416-17.
240. W. at 430.
241. W. at 429.
242. Weiss V. Nat'l Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 609 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
243. / ¿ a t 631.
244. /i/. at 632 n. 17
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impose "liability at any point along the causal chain of tertorism,"^''^ its view
that "foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their
criminal conduct that any confribution to such an organization facilitates that
conduct,"^''^ and its belief that because of the fungibility of money, "giving
support intended to aid an organization's peaceful activities frees up resources
that can be used for terrorist acts."^''^
In Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais^^^ a case based on similar facts brought
against Credit Lyonnais by the same plaintiffs that sued NatWest in Weiss, the
Court suggested that:
Because money is fungible, it is not generally possible to say that a particular
dollar caused a particular act or paid for a particular gun. If plaintiffs were
required to make such a showing, 2333(a) enforcement would be [so] difficult
that the stated purpose would be eviscerated. Rather, where the provision of ñinds
to a terrorist organization is a substantial faetor in carrying out terrorist acts, it is
thus the proximate cause of the terrorist attacks engaged in the organization.^ ''^
In re Chiquita Brands,^^^ the Court cited the standards established in Weiss
and Strauss with approval.^^' In that case, US citizens and the relatives of
deceased US citizens who were kidnapped, held hostage, and murdered by the
Colombian guerrilla organization known as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia (FARC), sued Chiquita for making numerous and substantial secret
payments to FARC, and for providing FARC with weapons, ammunition and
other supplies. The Court rejected the argument that the assistance allegedly
provided to FARC by Chiquita was not substantial because of FARC's vast
resources. According to the Court:
Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts from which a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude that Chiquita's actions of providing material support to FARC would
ñind some of FARC's terrorist activities, including the kidnappings and murders
of Americans. Thus, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged proximate causation.^ ^^
How substantial do individual financial confributions need to be in order to
result in liability? Judge Wood suggested in her dissenting opinion in Boim III
that it would be necessary to demonsfrate that the defendant's "actions
amounted to at least a sufficient cause of the tertorist act that killed David Boim,
245. Id at 631 (quoting S. REP. No. 102-342, at 22 (1992)).
246. Id. (quoting Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-32, §
301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (1996)).
247. Id. at 631-632 (quoting Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir.
2000)); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
248. Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., No. CV-06-0702 (CPS), 2006 WL 2862704 (E.D.N.Y.
October 5, 2006).
249. M a t 18.
250. In re Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute & S'holder Derivative Litig., 792 F.
Supp. 2d 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
251. W. at 1313-14.
252. W. at 1312.
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even if, on these facts, there were multiple such causes."^^-' According to her,
this would require a showing that the defendant donated to Hamas "an amount
that would have been sufficient to finance the shooting at the Beit El bus
stop."^^'' Where a finding of causation is based on the danger of harm created by
a collective action, plaintiffs would need to show that each act was in itself
substantial enough to have had the potential of causing the harm on its own.
This approach was questioned in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11:
Al Qaeda's ability io accomplish the coordinated large-scale terrorist attacks of
September 11th is dependent on the cumulative efforts and contributions of
untold thousands over an extended period of time. The commingling of funds and
services, and the fungible nature of money itself, essentially renders it impossible
to identify the specific material support, (much less the original source thereof),
that enabled al Qaeda to commit a particular terrorist attack. Individually, the
financial or other material support provided by a particular person or entity may
be of insignificant value. Yet, it is the collective contributions of all such
sponsors that gives birth to a repository of seemingly endless financial, military,
and logistical resources, from which the terrorist organization draws upon with
impunity to carry out its violent attacks against innocent civilians. Such a reality
bears directly on the issues of temporal and causal proximity.^^^
Thus, because the relevant consideration is the creation of danger through
collective action, it is enough that the total of the donations is sufficiently
substantial to cause the harm, although, as will often be the case with financial
donations, the risk does not stem from coordinated acts, but rather from the
cumulative effect of individual contributions.
In all of these cases, the courts acknowledged the same problem that the
Court in South African Apartheid Litigation stmggled with: the fungible nature
of money makes it difficult, if not in most cases impossible, to link a specific
financial confribution to a particular violation committed. However, in the
terrorism context, this led the courts to adopt a broad "substantial factor"
approach to proximate cause,^^^ instead of concluding that the link between
money and violations is always too remote to result in liability. ^ ^' For an act of
ftinding to be regarded as the proximate cause of an act of terrorism, they did not
require a demonstrable causal link between the money and the specific attack
suffered by the plaintiffs. ^^^
253. Boim v. Holy Land Found, for Relief and Dev't ("Boim III"), 549 F. 3d 685, 723 (7th Cir
2008).
254. Id at 724.
255. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 718 F. Supp. 2d 456, 492-93 (S.D.N Y
2010).
256. Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., No. CV-06-0702 (CPS), 2006 WL 2862704, at *\1
(E.D.N.Y. October 5, 2006).
257. See, e.g., Rothslein v. UBS AG, 647 F. Supp. 2d 292, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Wultz v. Iran,
755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 53 (D.D.C. 2010); for a discussion see Abecassis v. Wyatt, 785 F. Supp. 2d 614
632-33,646(S.D. Tex. 2011).
258. Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 429-30 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Weiss v. Nat'l
Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 609, 632 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
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In the terrorism context, the courts find it sufficient to show that the supply
of money is a substantial factor in the commission of terrorist offenses by the
recipient group.^^^ It does not matter how the group used the defendant's
money, or that the group may not have needed the defendant's money to carry
out its offenses.^^^ Although the courts insist on the need to show proximate
causation, they seem prepared to assume that money plays a substantial role in
the commission of terrorist attacks, rather than requiring that this be proved in
each case.^^' This approach seems to reflect the Supreme Court's view in
Humanitarian Law Project that there is a significant likelihood that material
support in the form of funding furthers terrorism because of its frmgible nature
and its potential to fr^Q up "other resources within the organization that may be
put to violent ends."^^^
Liabilify standards thus seem fairly broad in the terrorism context, but they
are not without limits. In some of the civil cases on liabilify for funding
terrorism filed under the ATA, courts held that no proximate causal link existed
between the fiinding and the terrorist attacks that harmed the plaintiffs. In
Rothstein v UBS,^^^ for example, victims and families of victims of terrorist
attacks committed by Hamas and Hezbollah in Israel sued UBS. They alleged
that the bank assisted the Govemment of Iran in financially supporting Hamas
and Hezbollah by transferring US currency to Iran. The Court summarized the
plaintiffs case against UBS as follows:
The Iranian govemment is a recognized sponsor of terrorism and has funded and
supported Hamas, Hezbollah, and other Palestinian terrorist organizations; . . .
these terrorist organizations require US cash dollars to carry out their activities;
and . . . UBS's involvement in banknote transactions with Iranian counterparties
had the effect of providing US cash dollars to the Iranian govemment, which, in
tum, supplied the aforementioned terrorist organizations with US cash dollars that
were used to facilitate terrorist acts.
The Court rejected the claim that UBS had thereby indirectly facilitated the
harm suffered by the victims at the hands of the terrorist groups, fmding that:
Plaintiffs . . . must at a minimum allege facts that show a proximate causal
relationship between UBS's transfers of funds to Iran and Hamas' and
Hezbollah's commission of the terrorist acts that caused plaintiffs' injuries. This
they have entirely failed to do. Among many other deficiencies in the causal
chain, the First Amended Complaint. . . does not allege that UBS is a primary or
even relatively significant source of US banknotes for the Iranian govemment. . .
Further still, there are no specific allegations showing that the terrorist groups
259. In re Terrorist Attacks, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 492-93.
260. In re Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute Derivative Litigation, 690 F. Supp. 2d
1296, 1314-15 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 6.
261. Weiss, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 631-32.
262. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725 (2010).
263. Rothstein v. UBS AG, 647 F. Supp. 2d 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
264. Id at 293.
2012] NO COMPLICITY LIABILITY 499
here in question raise their funds from monies transferred fi-om Iran.^^^
The Court distinguished Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais^^^ and Linde v. Arab
ê^^ on the basis that in those two cases, the plaintiffs had suggested a
"direct involvement between the defendant banks and the terrorist organizations
or "fronts" those organizations directly controUed,"^^^ while no such direct
relationship was alleged in Rothstein?^^ Thus, not only was the impact of the
supply of US currency to the Iranian govemment on the terrorist acts
insufficiently demonstrated, but the link between the defendants and the
terrorists was regarded as too tenuous to result in liability.^ '^^
The causation standards thus far discussed all stem from litigation under
the ATA. However, some of the cases dealing with liability for ñinding
terrorism brought claims under the ATCA. In Almog v. Arab BankP^ when
analyzing whether Arab Bank's conduct had a substandal effect on the
intemational law violations carried out by the terrorists, the Court found that
plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that "their injuries were caused by suicide
bombings or other attacks perpefrated by the terrorist organizations to which
Arab Bank provided banking services."^^^ However, the plaintiffs would "have
to prove that the Bank provided these services to the particular group
responsible for the attacks giving rise to their injuries."^^-' Arab Bank went
beyond providing financial services, as it played an acdve role in the
implementation of the benefit plan. The Court nevertheless specifically stated
that substantial effect was sufficiently alleged under both theories of the
plaintiffs,^^'' and the first liabilify theory was based only on the provision of
financial services.^^^ This case suggests that the mere provision of financial
services could in itself result in complicity liability under the ATCA, as long as
it substantially assisted terrorism. This presupposes that financial services can
265. Id at 294.
266. Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., No. CV-06-0702 (CPS), 2006 WL 2862704 (E.D.N.Y.
October 5,2006).
267. Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
268. Rothstein, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 294.
269. Id
270. Rothstein was cited with approval in Wultz v. Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 22 (D.D.C. 2010)
(stressing the decisive nature of the fact that money had allegedly been transferred direetly by the
Bank of China to accounts held on behalf of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad).
271. Almogv. Arab Bank PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257 (B.D.N.Y. 2007).
272. /i/. at 291.
273. ld.\ See also Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (similar
claim discussed under the ATA).
274. Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 291 ("Plaintiffs' allegations with respect to the substantial effect
of Arab Bank's conduct in bringing about the underlying violations of a norm of intemational law
are also suffieient under both factual theories").
275. Id. at 290 ("plaintiffs' first factual theory focuses on Arab Bank's knowing provision of
banking services, including the maintenance of accounts, for HAMAS and other terrorist
organizations, terrorist front organizations, and individual supporters of terrorist organizations").
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facilitate terrorist acts.
The decision applies standards similar to those derived from litigation
tinder the ATA in the context of aiding and abetting liability under the ATCA.
Liabilify requires a link between the defendant's act of assistance and the
organization to which the financial services were provided, but not between the
service and the specific violation that was carried out. This stands in stark
contrast to the approach adopted in South African Apartheid Litigation, but it
needs to be taken into account that the Court in Almog was influenced by the
fact that the acts of complicify occurred in the context of terrorism. The Court
stressed that its approach was:
supported by the fact that Arab Bank's alleged conduct is exactly the type of
conduct that the applicable Conventions and related US laws are aimed at
preventing. Both the Conventions and the ATA highlight the enabling nature of
such eonduet in bringing about the underlying violations of intemational law.^ ^^
Indeed, in all of the cases discussed above, the adoption of a broad
"substantial factor" approach to proximate cause in order to overcome the
causation problems due to the fungibilify of money was clearly driven by the
consideration that a higher standard of causation would undermine the objective
to cut off all frinding for terrorist organizations.
C Funding of Organizations with Multiple Purposes
One aspect of fimding regimes that commit gross human rights violations is
that however bad their human rights record, or however corrupt, regimes use
frinds to carry out a multitude of frinctions. The fungibility of money might then
have a different impact than in the context of funds donated to terrorist
organizations, as it might be more difficult to infer routinely that the funds made
available to a govemment will go towards the realization of goals that are
prohibited by intemational law. Comparable problems arose in some of the cases
on terrorism finaneing to organizations that carry out charitable frinctions, or
cases on financing regimes deemed to be state sponsors of terrorism.
In Boim lllP^ the Court addressed the liabilify of financiers who fund
organizations that engage in both terrorist and social welfare services. The case
involved financial donations made to Hamas, an organization that undertakes
terrorist activities as well as social welfare services and charitable work.^^^ The
majorify in Boim HI was unequivocal in holding that directing support
exelusively towards the non-violent activities of the organization did not excuse
complicify liabilify.^^' The Court reasoned that the fungibility of money made it
276. Id. at 293.
277. Boim v. Holy Und Found, for Relief and Dev't ("Boim 111"), 549 F. 3d 685 (7th Cir.
2008).
278. Id at 698.
279. Id. at 698-99.
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possible for Hamas to receive a donation of money earmarked for social services
and then transfer an amount equal to the donation from its social services
"account" to its terrorism "account."-^^'' Additionally, the Court opined that
Hamas' social welfare activities indirectly reinforced its terrorist activities by
enhancing Hamas's popularity among the Palestinian population and funding
schools that indoctrinate children.^^' This led to the far-reaching conclusion that
anyone who knowingly contributes to an organization that engages in tertorism
is knowingly contributing to the organization's terrorist activities, even if the
money was explicitly dedicated to supporting its charitable work.^^^
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the US Supreme Court endorsed
this view in holding that, "Money is fungible, and '[w]hen foreign terrorist
organizations that have a dual sfructure raise funds, they highlight the civilian
and humanitarian ends to which such moneys could be put.' . . . [but] '[f]unds
raised ostensibly for charitable purposes have in the past been redirected by
some terrorist groups to fund the purchase of arms and explosives.'"^^^
Despite the existence of such a danger, it is doubtful that this reasoning
provides sufficient justification for dispensing with any proximate cause
requirement in civil litigation and for holding each donor indiscriminately liable
for tertorist acts. In his dissent. Judge Rovner rightly criticized the majority's
approach to causation by emphasizing that it does not leave room to distinguish
individuals who purposely fund terrorism from those who are further removed
and whose donation has "at most, an indirect, uncertain, and unintended effect
on terrorist activity."^^'' He argued instead that the degree of responsibility of
funders should depend on who money was being donated to and for what
purposes. In this respect, he distinguished several scenarios, explaining:
If indeed the defendants were directing money into a central Hamas ñind out of
which all Hamas expenses-whether for humanitarian or terrorist activities-were
paid, it would be easy to see that the defendants were supporting Hamas's
terrorism even if their contributions were earmarked for eharity. In fact, the case
is not as simple as that. For example, much of the money that defendant HLF
provided to Hamas apparently was directed not to Hamas per se but to a variety
of zakat committees and other eharitable entities, including a hospital in Gaza,
that were controlled by Hamas. . . . if the zakat committees and other recipients of
HLF's funding were mere ñ-onts for Hamas or were used to launder donations
targeted for Hamas generally, then those donations ought to be treated as if they
were direct donations to Hamas itself. But to the extent that these Hamas
subsidiary organizations actually were engaged solely in humanitarian work and
HLF was sending its money to those subsidiaries to support that work, HLF is
one or more significant steps removed from the direct financing of terrorism and
280. Id
281. Id
282. Id
283. Holder v. Humanitarian Uw Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725-26 (2010).
284. Boim v. Holy Land Found, for Relief and Dev't ("Boim III"), 549 F. 3d 685, 705 (7th Cir.
2008).
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the case for HLF's liability for terrorism is, in my view, a much less compelling
one. Defendant AMS is yet another step removed, in that AMS is alleged to have
contributed money not to Hamas but to HLF
Judge Rovner accepted that donations to Hamas's humanitarian activities
make other funds available for terrorism and provide cover to enhance Hamas's
image.^^^ However, he contested that someone who makes donations to
Hamas's charitable subsidiaries automatically provides material support to
Hamas's terrorist acts. Instead, "the donor must at least know that the financial
or other support he lends to Hamas will be used to commit terrorist acts."^^^
Rejecting a general rule in favor of liability for any ftinding that might find its
way to a terrorist organization, he sfressed the importance of determining a
sufficiently close link between the ftinding and the terrorist acts for which the
ftinders are being held liable. ^^ ^
Establishing such a link would require distinguishing between financial
support provided to a terrorist organization directly from financial support
provided to a charitable entity controlled by that organization, or an
intermediary organization.^^^ In the first scenario, the ftmder is sufficiently
close to the terrorist organization to be held liable for terrorist acts, whereas in
the latter situations deciding proximity would require a detailed examination. ^ *^^
While it is not necessary to link donations or other support to a specific terrorist
act. Judge Rovner suggested that it needs to be proved that the support the
defendants were alleged to have given Hamas were a cause of Hamas's
terrorism^^' and could be linked to the specific terrorist acts carried out by
Hamas against the plaintiffs. Expert evidence by someone "familiar with
Hamas's financial sfructure, or with the financing of terrorism generally"^^^ is
necessary to link the various types of support provided to Hamas, including
donations to its humanitarian activities, with its terrorist acts. He argued that:
Where it is open to question, as I believe it is, whether even humanitarian support
given to Hamas, to its charitable subsidiary, or to a hospital or other institution
that receives funding from Hamas, actually contributes to Hamas's terrorist
activities, it should be left to fact finding in individual cases . . . to evaluate, based
on the evidence presented in those cases, what types of support to Hamas and its
affiliated entities actually cause terrorism.^ -^^
The ftjrther removed the financier is from the organization carrying out the
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terrorist act, the more thorough this analysis has to be.^^^ Judge Wood equally
cautioned in her dissent that a showing of proximate cause was essential to
decide "how far down the chain of affiliates, in this shadowy world, the statute
was designed to reach, and how deeply Hamas must be embedded in the
recipient organization. ''^ ^
To summarize, it seems as if a consensus existed in Boim III that where
funding was provided directly to Hamas, a causal link between the funding and
the terrorist acts carried out by that organization would be assumed, though
Judge Wood warns that the donation should be sufficiently substantial to have
furthered the terrorist activities.^^^ The main distinction between the majorify
and the dissenting opinions focuses on evaluating cases in which donations only
indirectly benefit Hamas. While the majority assumes liability even then, the
minority requires a thorough analysis of a causal link and the relevant mens rea
in order to hold a donor liable for terrorist activities.
In Abecassis v. Wyatt,^^'' the Court highlighted that the majority approach
in Boim III could potentially lead to almost limitless liability, by raising the
following hypothetical questions:
Could [liability] extend to a man in St. Louis who lacks significant understanding
of the OFP or Hussein's ñinding of terrorism but who is generally aware that
Hamas is a Palestinian terrorist group that targets Israelis, and who fills his car
with gasoline that the service station had purchased from a refining company that
had purchased it from another company that had paid kickbacks to Hussein to
receive its allocation of Iraqi oil?^^^
While the Court in Abecassis appreciated that such far-reaching liability
was not intended by the Boim III majorify, it nevertheless pointed out that by
removing causation and requiring no more than a mens rea of awareness that the
final recipient of the funds was a terrorist organization, the principles developed
in Boim III left the limits of liabilify wide open.^^^
The Abecassis situation is distinguishable from Boim III because the
payments at issue were made to a regime, not to a terrorist organization.^"" In
this case, the defendants, companies, and individuals involved in the oil business
purchased oil from Iraq either directly fiom Hussein's govemment or through
third parties that purchased from Hussein's govemment in violation of the
United Nations Oil for Food Program (OFP).^"' The plaintiffs allege that the oil
purchased from Iraq included payments in the form of illegal kickbacks to
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Hussein through secret bank accounts in Jordan.-"'^ These bank accounts
allegedly funded reward payments to families of suicide bombers killed while
carrying out terrorist attacks. According to the plaintiffs, such payments were
important to recruiting terrorists. ^ ''^
Given that the plaintiffs did not suggest that Hussein himself had carried
out the terrorist attacks of which they were the victims, the Court held that to
succeed with their claim, they would have had to allege, "at a minimum, that
each defendant knew that the oil it was buying through the OFP was tied to a
kickback to Hussein and that Hussein was using OFP kickback money to ftind
terrorism that targeted American nadonals."^''''
The Court found that the plaintiffs' inferences were too speculative.^"^ No
factual allegation was presented that the money illegally given to Hussein was
paid to the family of terrorists.^'^^ The kickback could have had multiple uses
other than promoting terrorist attacks against the plaintiffs.-"^' In fact, one of the
news articles cited in the plaintiffs' complaint states that Hussein used the
money to "rearm his troops and sustain the luxury that he and his supporters
308
Thus, where the recipient of funds was not directly engaged in the terrorist
attacks, the Court required a showing that the money of the defendants, or at
least money stemming from the fund into which the defendants had made their
payments, found its way to the organization that committed the terrorist attack
that harmed the plaintiffs.•'^^ The Court was not prepared to infer from the
fimgibilify of money that any payment to a third party who supports a terrorist
organization renders the funder liable on the basis that his or her money freed up
funds the third parfy could then use to support the terrorist organization.
In 2011, the Court rendered a new decision based on an amended complaint
in which the plaintiffs specified their allegations by introducing additional
newspaper articles from the relevant period, suggesting that Hussein made
reward payments to the families of Palestinian martyrs and generally supported
terrorist attacks against Israel.-"^ The Court held that the allegadons of the
kickback scheme, the evidence of Hussein's use of funds to pay families of
suicide bombers, and the evidence that such payments were well-knovra "create
a high likelihood" that the money made available to Hussein would be used to
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promote terrorist attacks.^ ' ' The Court reasoned that:
Because money is fungible, even if Hussein had not used the funds given to him
by the defendants for terrorism, the use of the kiekbaeks for a different purpose
would have ñ-eed money otherwise needed for that purpose and made it available
for terrorist activities. . . . like giving a loaded gun to a child, or giving money to
Hamas, giving money to a state sponsor of terrorism in knowing violation of strict
rules set for transacting business with that country is an act dangerous to human
life.^'2
This change in approach was relied on heavily in Humanitarian Law
P^^ and Boim III. ^' ' ' Unlike those two cases, however, the Court in
Abecassis adopted a proximate cause requirement. Even though it was
acknowledged that the link between the plaintiffs' injuries and the defendants
was tenuous, it was nevertheless regarded as sufficient.
In the context of its proximate cause analysis, the Cotiri considered the
implications of the fact that the money had been made available to a govemment
rather than a terrorist organization.-"^ In its previous decision, the Court had
emphasized the fact that the Hussein regime could not be compared to the front
organizations in Boim III that were accused of funneling money to Hamas,
because Iraq was a "recognized sovereign nation with a variety of
responsibilities and pursuing a variety of interests, with whom American and
other companies were encouraged to do business, with resfrictions."^'^ This
seems to suggest that because states carry out a multitude of legitimate
frinctions, even with state sponsors of terrorism, it cannot be assumed that they
will use all available funds to finance terrorism. How a sovereign state decides
to use its finances might break the chain of causation between the defendant and
the terrorist attacks. In the second Abecassis decision, the Court retumed to the
question of differences:
[There are] differences between paying money to a state sponsor of terrorism and
paying money to a foreign terrorist organization. Iraq under Hussein was not the
same as Hamas or the terrorist organizations in Humanitarian Law Project who
were "so tainted by their criminal eonduet that any contribution to sueh an
organization facilitates that conduct." Money provided to Iraq was not tainted in
the same way as money provided to a designated foreign terrorist organization.
Oil companies were permitted and even encouraged to do business with Iraq. But
they were restricted to doing so within the bounds of the OFP. The allegations are
that the defendants all knowingly bypassed the strict rules of the OFP by agreeing
to pay the kickbacks described. The purpose of these kiekbaeks was clearly to
provide money to Hussein for unlimited discretionary use rather than the very
311. W. at 647-48.
312. Id at (Al.
313. Holder V. Humanitarian Uw Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725-26 (2010)
314. Boim V. Holy Und Found, for Relief and Dev't ("Boim HI"), 549 F. 3d 685 (7th Cir.
2008).
315. Abecassis v. Wyatt, 785 F. Supp. 2d 614, 649 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
316. Abecassis v. Wyatt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 623, 666 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
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limited humanitarian uses permitted for money paid to the OFP eserow account.
Given the expanded allegations about Hussein's publicly stated dedication to, and
involvement in, attacks on Israel, it was foreseeable that if given off-book money,
Hussein would use at least some of it to support terrorist attaeks in that country
intended and likely to target Americans.
The Court thus put some limits on the analogy with the views promoted in
Humanitarian Law Project and Boim III regarding the fungibility of money and
the resulting "freeing up [of] funds" theory in the context of money made
available to state sponsors of terrorism. Giving funds to a state sponsor of
tertorism only seems to give rise to far-reaching assumption of liability if the
money was paid in violation of an existing sanction system. This decision aligns
with that in Rothstein, another case in which money was given to a state sponsor
of terrorism. In this case, Iran, rather than to a tertorist organization directly, and
the Court reasoned that restrictions on supporting terrorist organizations did not
equally apply to state sponsors of terrorism, because:
"Congressional poliey determinations are likely to be quite different with respect
to the two entities, as reflected by the fact that 50 U.S.C.App. [section] 2405(j)(l)
permits certain transactions with state sponsors of terrorism as long as a valid
license is obtained."-^  ' ^
Consequently, not every financial loan or donation to a regime, even one
that is regarded as a state sponsor of tertorism, will result in liability for terrorist
acts financially supported by that regime. Since regimes might pursue a
multitude of purposes, many of which are legitimate, there might be good cause
to make money available to them. The all-encompassing prohibition of
providing financial support to tertorist organizations and the approach to civil
liability of funders of tertorism cannot be easily fransferred to states. Rather,
such far-reaching liability is only friggered by a violation of specific regulations,
restrictions or sanctions that were put in place precisely to avoid making funds
available to those states outside of confined and sfrictly confroUed
circumstances.
While the Court in Abecassis mentioned this only in passing, the change in
approach might have been triggered in part by the fact that the amended
complaint alleged a violation of Section 2332D, which makes it an offense to
engage in financial transactions with a country that is designated as a state
sponsor of terrorism outside of existing regulations.
V.
CONSEQUENCES FOR COMPLICITY LIABILITY FOR FINANCING GROSS HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Tuming to the context of funding regimes that commit gross human rights
317. Abecassis, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 649.
318. Rothstein v. UBS AG, 772 F. Supp. 2d 511, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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violations, where should courts draw the line between acceptable business
practices and activities that make the corporation complicit in these violations?
It is clear that merely doing business with regimes does not result in complicity
liability.-"^ Nor does assisting a regime reflexively equate with facilitating the
violations it carries out.^ ^*' Formulated differently, commercial activities,
without more, do not give rise to aiding and abetting liability.-'^' In the context
of ATCA cases for complicity liability, these principles have been understood
by some courts to mean that commercial loans are not close enough to the
violations committed, and their impact is not direct enough, to satisfy the actus
reus of aiding and abetting liability in the form of practical assistance that has a
substantial effeet on the occurring abuses. Thus, the Court in South African
Apartheid Litigation held that commercial loans and other routine banking
services do not result in complicity liability.•'^^
In the context of ftinding terrorism, on the other hand, the courts reftised to
exempt routine banking services per se from liability.^ ^-^ In Almog, the Court
reached such a conclusion applying the ATCA,^^'' which suggests that the
provision of funds can satisfy the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability
under the ATCA and thus might have a substantial effect on the gross
intemational law violations carried out by the recipients. ^ ^^  It moreover
indicates that no reasons inherent in the cause of action under the ATCA point
towards a general exclusion of ftinding from such liability. This means that
when determining actions under the ATCA for complicity liability of lenders to
regimes that commit gross human rights violations, nothing would prevent the
courts from regarding the provision of funding, including routine commercial
funding, as meeting the actus reus requirement of complicity liability where its
319. In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
320. Id,\ see also Mastafa v. Australian Wheat Bd. Ltd., No. 07 Civ. 7955 (GEL), 2008 WL
4378443, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008).
321. Doe V. Nestle, SA., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1090 (CD. Cal. 2010).
322. In re South African Apartheid, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 269; Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1099.
323. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2011, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 832-34 (S.D.N.Y.
2005); In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 718 F. Supp. 2d 456, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);
Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 588 (;E.D.N.Y. 2005); Almog v. Arab Bank PLC,
471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).; Weiss v. Nat'l Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d
609, 625 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., No. CV-06-0702 (CPS), 2006 WL
2862704, at • 12 (E.D.N.Y. October 5, 2006). However, some courts suggested that such services did
not meet the "substantial assistance" requirements of aiding and abetting liability; See Strauss, 2006
WL 2862704 at *9; Weiss. 453 F.Supp.2d at 621; Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 425
(E.D.N.Y. 2009). For a critical discussion of this approach see supra section 1V(A).
324. Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 291 ("Arab Bank ignores that acts which in themselves may be
benign, if done for a benign purpose, may be actionable if done with the knowledge that they are
supporting unlawful acts").
325. Another case where aiding and abetting liability for the provision of funding was not
excluded per se in an action under the ATCA is that of Mastafa, 2008 WL 4378443, will be
discussed infra in this section.
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substantial effect on the commission of these offences can be shown in the
individual case.
This is also in Une with US case law on complicity liabilify for the
provision of commercial goods and services other than funding, both in the
context of litigation under the ATCA-'^ ^ and that of criminal aiding and abetting
and conspiracy cases.^^^ Such cases equally suggest that the commercial nattire
of a transaction does not in itself result in an exemption from liabilify.
The courts either explicitly argued that the routine/commercial nature of the
transactions was significant primarily when examining the defendant's mens
rea, because routine transactions might raise less grotind for suspicion with
regard to the harmful use of the frinds provided,^^^ or implied such a
conclusion.^^^ At the same time, they rejected the view that the routine nature of
these services means that they do not substantially fiirther terrorism or the
commission of other offenses.-^ -'*'
South African Apartheid Litigation clearly adopts a different approach in
exempting the providers of commercial services, including loans, fiom
complicity liabilify unless they were the direct means through which the
326. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1027 (W.D. Wash. 2005), aff d on other
grounds, 503 F.3d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 2007)
327. See, e.g. Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 709-712 (1943); United States v.
Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283, 285-86 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Pino-Pérez, 870 F.2d 1230,
1235 (7th Cir. 1989).
328. Direct Sales Co., 319 US at 711 ("The difference between sugar, cans, and other articles of
normal trade, on the one hand, and narcotic drugs, machine guns and such restricted commodities,
on the other, arising from the latters' inherent capacity for harm and from the very fact they are
restricted, makes a difference in the quantity of proof required to show knowledge that the buyer will
utilize the article unlawfully. Additional facts, such as quantity sales, high pressure sales methods,
abnormal increases in the size of the buyer's purchases, etc., which would be wholly innocuous or
not more than ground for suspicion in relation to unrestricted goods, may furnish conclusive
evidence, in respect to restricted articles, that the seller knows the buyer has an illegal object and
enterprise"); Pino-Pérez, 870 F.2d at 1235 ("One who sells a small-or for that matter a large-
quantity of drugs to a kingpin is not by virtue of the sale alone an aider and abettor. It depends on
what he knows and what he wants"); Weiss, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 625 ("In holding that there could be
no liability on the basis of "routine banking business" that court did not mean that the provision of
basic banking services could never give rise to bank liability. Rather the court relied on the routine
nature of the banking services to conclude that the defendant bank had no knowledge of the client's
terrorist activities)".
329. Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 291 ("Given plaintiffs' allegations regarding the knowing and
intentional nature of the Bank's activities, there is nothing 'routine' about the services the Bank is
alleged to have provided"); Corrie, 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1027, aff'd on other grounds, 503 F.3d at
977 ("[o]ne who merely sells goods to a buyer is not an aider and abettor of crimes that the buyer
might commit, even if the seller knows that the buyer is likely to use the goods unlawfully, because
the seller does not share the specific intent to further the buyer's venture"); ¡n re Terrorist Attacks on
September 11,2011,349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("there can be no bank liability for
injuries eaused by money routinely passing through the bank. Saudi American Bank is not alleged to
have known that anything relating to terrorism was occurring through the services it provided").
330. See discussion supra sections 1I(C)(5) and III(A).
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principal offense was carried out.^^' To the extent that this approach might be
explained by the Court's reliance on the Ministries case as the decisive authority
on this matter, this case provides a weak basis for exempting the providers of
commercial loans from all potential civil complicify liability.^-'^ Indeed, just as
in the US cases in the areas of ftinding terrorism and criminal complicity on the
basis of commercial transactions, Nuremberg case law suggests that the
commercial nature of a transaction is primarily relevant in the context of a mens
rea analysis.^^^ Moreover, it does not exclude commercial loans as such from
complicity liability.^ -"*
Consequently, complicity liabilify should not generally exempt all
commercial loans. Instead, it should depend on a thorough analysis of both the
actus reus and the mens rea in every case in which such liabilify is alleged. An
approach that does not exempt/ler se any activities or fransactions from liability
avoids the consequence that lenders are ex ante freed from all complicity
liabilify, and therefore provides legal incentive to employ due diligence in
assessing the potential impact their loans might have on gross human rights
violations.
Such an exemption would be particularly objectionable in light of the main
lesson leamed from the ftinding of terrorism cases, i.e., that money, far from
always being harmless, can be a particularly dangerous commodity. While
money is neutral in itself, it is an essential prerequisite for an indefinite range of
activities that could and would not take place without it. The effect of money,
whether beneficial or harmful, does not depend on its inherent quality, but rather
on how it is being used by those who receive it.^ ^^ This, however, is also to tme
for other goods, including those that are considered to be inherently harmful.
Even with a product such as the poison gas Zyklon B, the direct and primary
cause of resulting harm is its use for detrimental purposes, not the provision of
gas by itself The main difference with money is that an additional act must take
place for the harmftil result to occur, such as purchasing of the means through
331. In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 259, 264-69 (S DN Y
2009).
332. See diseussion supra sections III(A) and III(E)(1).
333. United States v. Von Weizsäcker ("The Ministries Case"), 14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE ERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 [T.W.C.], at
853-54 (Nuemberg Military Tribs. 1950) ("even if it were assumed that the defendant Rasehe took
or played a deeisive role in the granting of said applications for loans to the SS it would be difficult
to find him guilty of participation in the slave-labor program on that account. The evidence adduced
by the prosecution to show knowledge on the part of Rasehe as to what was taking place in the SS
enterprises with respect to labor is very unconvincing"). See further diseussion supra section
III(E)(1)
334. See diseussion supra section III(E)(I). In this respect, the aequittal of Rasehe under count
five, on which the court in the South Afriea case primarily relied, is an exception rather than
representative of Nuremberg ease law on this issue.
335. Rita Roea & Franeesca Manta, Values Added, The Challenge of Integrating Human Rights
into the Financial Sector (The Danish Institute for Human Rights), 2010, at 6.
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which the violations can be carried out. However, this does not mean that, for
example, financing the purchase of Zyklon B could not be as essential for the
killings carried out with this gas than the purchase of the gas itself That the link
is more direct and obvious in the latter case does not mean that it can therefore
not also be substantial in the former.
If a case-by-case analysis is required, this raises the question of what link
between the money and the violations is necessary for a finding of liabilify. Here
a close look at the case law on funding terrorism might be helpful, as courts
have in that context grappled with the issue in depth. Clearly, analogies between
frinding terrorism and funding gross human rights violations must be approached
with caution, given that the legal status of terrorist organizations is not the same
as that of a sovereign state. However, both scenarios also have similarities, as
they deal with the impact of financial assistance, including routine commercial
banking services, on serious crimes committed by their recipients.
The majorify of courts in the terrorism cases analyzed above require a
showing of proximate cause demonstrating that the fiinds were a substantial
factor in the resulting terrorist activities and that the resulting harm was a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the funding. However, plaintiffs are not
required to show that without the particular funding, the acts could not have
been carried out.-'-'^  This seems to coincide nicely with the actus reus and
causation standards accepted South African Apartheid Litigation, (i.e., the
requirement of an act of practical assistance that needs to have a substantial
effect on the commission of the violation, without necessarily being a conditio
sine qua non)?^^
Nevertheless, Judge Scheindlin deduced from the nature and fringibility of
money that loans can never be sufficiently close to the violations to result in
complicity liability of the commercial lender,^-'* while in the context of fiinding
terrorism, the courts draw the opposite conclusion. ^ •'^  This difference might be
explained by the fact that even where cases on funding terrorism were argued
and decided under the ATCA rather than the ATA, the courts emphasized that
their approaches to the standards of liability were infiuenced by the policy
decisions expressed in relevant intemational instruments as well as the ATA.-''*^
Liabilify standards are therefore defined broadly in the terrorism context to give
336. 5ee, e.g., Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). See also
discussion supra section 1V(B).
337. In re South Afincan Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228,257-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
338. Id. at 269.
339. See, for example, Boim v. Holy Und Found, for Relief and Dev't ("Boim III"), 549 F. 3d
685, 691 (7th Cir. 2008); Goldberg, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 429; In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11,
2001, 718 F. Supp. 2d 456, 492-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Abecassis v. Wyatt, 785 F. Supp. 2d 614, 649
(S.D.Tex. 2011).
340. Almog V. Arab Bank PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 293 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
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effect to specific legislative and policy decisions.-''"
Treaties such as the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism—which refiect the conviction that money is not always
neutral and thus might be a particularly dangerous commodity—do not exist
with regard to the financing of gross human rights violations. However, the
absence of an international convention on this issue only means that states are
under no intemational treaty obligation specifically to tackle the financing of
gross himian rights violations. It does not follow that funding directed towards
such financing is therefore shielded from complicity liability.
The lack of a treaty and specific domestic legislation means, however, that
unlike the terrorism cases, courts hearing claims in the area of financing gross
human rights violations neither have to, nor can they, derive liability standards
by relying on clearly defined policy decisions. Indeed, while the ATA expressly
targets the provision of material support in the form of funds and other financial
services, this is not the case in ATCA litigation for complicity in gross human
rights violations. Courts are left to decide how to apply the general liability
standards of the ATCA to cases of financing violations of the law of nations,
and whether and to what extent to draw on the principles developed in the
context of funding terrorism.
The similarities between the two situations could militate in favor of
borrowing the liability standards from the terrorism context. Judge Posner's
statement in Boim III conceming the significance of civil remedies against the
financiers as an effective measure to "cut the terrorists' lifeline,"^''^ for example,
might equally apply to funders of gross human rights violations. This is
emphasized by a powerful quote from the former South African Prime Minister
John Voster, who stated that "each bank loan, each new investment is another
brick in the wall of our continued existence."-'''^ Indeed, many regimes that
commit gross human rights violations depend on foreign funds in order to
finance their policies, and sometimes even for their survival. In his Study of the
impact of foreign economic aid and assistance on respect for human rights in
Chile, Antonio Cassese remarked:
[I]n some cases, the flow of capital goods ean help prop up the repressive system,
by making it economically viable: in this way, the economic assistance becomes
instrumental in maintaining and prolonging in time disregard for eivil and
political fi-eedoms.
341. See, e.g., Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., No. CV-06-0702 (CPS), 2006 WL 2862704, at
*18 (E.D.N.Y. October 5, 2006); Weiss v. Nat'l Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 609, 631-
32 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Goldberg, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 429.
342. Boim ///, 549 F.3d at 691.
343. Complaint at 391, Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007)
avai7aè/eo/www.khulumani.net/attachments/259_IOiulumani%20Complaint.pdf.
344. U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Prot.
of Minorities, Study of the Impact of Foreign Economic Aid and Assistance on Respect for Human
Rights in Chile, 19-20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/412 (July 20, 1978).
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Based on a thorough statistical analysis of the Chilean budget during the first
years of the Pinochet dictatorship, Cassese concluded that an adverse effect on
human rights might even arise in cases where the donor or lender gave financial
assistance with the purpose of promoting the protection of human rights, as such
assistance can free up other resources that the primary violator may then use to
prolong the repression.-^^^
This shows that both the far-reaching effect of funding in general, and the
problems raised by the fungibility of money in particular, are not unique to the
context of terrorism.^^^ Rather, these also arise in the context of providing funds
to states that commit gross human rights violations.^^^ Indeed, a bank lending
money to a govemment usually cannot control the use of these funds any more
than funders who earmark money to terrorist organizations for financing
charitable projeets. In both scenarios, the effects of monetary contributions on
the commission of crimes need to be established in spite of the fungible nature
of money.
Despite these similarities, a key difference between the terrorism cases and
ftinding violating regimes is that the former are organizations with criminal
purposes. As such, prohibitive action may be taken against them: Their assets
can be frozen,-'^^ membership is often criminalized,^^^ and in the United States
they might be designated as foreign terrorist organizations.^^'•' Thus, FTOs
clearly stand outside of legal confines. Sovereign states, on the other hand, in
principle receive the protection of intemational law, and the intemational
community recognizes acts of the govemments of sovereign states, even where
these govemments have come into power and/or govem their country by
violating domestic law or the use of violence.-'^' Moreover, even govemments
that regularly commit gross human rights violations tend to carry out a multitude
of legitimate state functions. It is accordingly more facially suspect to interact
with a known terrorist organization than to do business with a state. The former
will often be unlawftil in itself, while doing business with a rogue state is only
unlawful under very narrow circumstances.-'^^
345. Id, at 24. See also Isabel Letelier & Michael MofFitt. Supporting Suppression:
Multinational Banks in Chile, RACE & CLASS, Oct. 1978, at 111.
346. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 698-699. See also Strauss, 2006 WL 2862704, at *18.
347. Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Veerle Opgenhaffen, supra note 4 at 183-197; Juan Pablo
Bohoslavsky & Mariana Rulli, supra note 4. For a similar discussion, on the question of odious debt,
see SABINE MICHALOWSKI (2007), supra note 5 at 53-54.
348. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); Council Regulation
881/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 139/9) (EC); Fin. Action Task Force, Intemational Best Practices -
Freezing Terrorist Assets, (Jun. 23, 2009), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/30/43/34242709.pdf
349. This is not the case in the US, but in the U.K., ^ee Terrorism Act 2000, § 11 (Eng.).
350. 8 U.S.C. §1189(a) (2006).
351. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 117-120 (2ded. 2005).
352. E.g., where the state was designated a state sponsor of terrorism.
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However, the case of Hamas shows that the line between terrorist
organizations and govemments cannot always be drawn neatly. In some
circumstances, terrorist organizations might assume what in other contexts
would be a state function, e.g., the provision of social welfare services.-'^-'
Moreover, they might come into power and ultimately form the government of a
country.^ ^"* Conversely, govemments such as that of Iraq under Saddam Hussein
can be regarded as state sponsors of terrorism^^^ or stand accused of carrying
out terrorist attacks.^^^ Nevertheless, the discussions in Abecassis^^^ and
Rothstein^^^ show that in the terrorism context, the courts clearly distinguish
terrorist organizations from state sponsors of terrorism and apply different
principles when determining the liability of the funder in each case.
Mastafa is one of the few cases that has dealt with the issue of complicity
liability for making available funds to a state outside of the terrorism context. ^ ^^
Mastafa provides an interesting case study for a comparison of liabilify
standards because (i) it involved money paid to a state rather than an FTO, (ii)
considered liability for gross human rights violations instead of terrorist attacks,
and (iii) was decided under the ATCA rather than the ATA. The plaintiffs in
Mastafa were Kurdish women who alleged that their husbands had been
imprisoned, tortured, and killed by the Saddam Hussein regime. They brought a
claim against Ausfralian Wheat Board (AWB) and against Banque Nationale De
Paris Paribas (BNP), the latter of which is of greatest interest for current
purposes.
Just like Abecassis, Mastafa involved alleged kickbacks paid to Saddam
Hussein in the context of the OFP. AWB had sold wheat to Iraq under the OFP
and paid fees for "inland transportation" and other service to the Hussein regime
as a condition for its continued sales under the OFP. According to the plaintiffs,
these payments were in fact "kickbacks," "designed to provide the Hussein
353. As discussed with regard to Hamas in Boim v. Holy Land Found, for Relief and Dev't
("Boim 111"), 549 F. 3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008).
354. 5ee Peter Margulies, Laws of Unintended Consequences: Terrorist Financing Restrictions
and Transitions to Democracy, 20 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 65 (2007).
355. Abecassis v. Wyatt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 623, 666 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
356. Mastafa v. Australian Wheat Bd. Ltd., No. 07 Civ. 7955 (GEL), 2008 WL 4378443
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008).
357. Abecassis v. Wyatt, 785 F. Supp. 2d 614, 649 (S.D. Tex. 2011) ("Iraq under Hussein was
not the same as Hamas or the terrorist organizations in Humanitarian Law Project who were 'so
tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that
conduct.' Money provided to Iraq was not tainted in the same way as money provided to a
designated foreign terrorist organization").
358. Rothstein v. UBS AG, 772 F. Supp. 2d 511, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("Congressional policy
determinations are likely to be quite different with respect to the two entities, as reflected by the fact
that 50 U.S.C. App. § 2405G)(l) permits certain transactions with state sponsors of terrorism as long
as a valid license is obtained").
359. Mastafa, 2008 WL 4378443.
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regime with hard currency the sanctions otherwise denied it."^^^ To implement
the OFP, an escrow account was created in which purchasers of Iraqi oil could
deposit payment, while sellers of authorized goods received payment from it, all
under the control of the UN Secretary General.^^' That account was
administered by BNP. BNP was accused of aiding and abetting the intemational
law violations carried out by Saddam Hussein by disbursing ftinds from the
escrow account to AWB, which used some portion of those funds to pay
kickbacks to the Hussein regime.^^^ When discussing the liability of BNP, the
Court reasoned:
[A]iding the Hussein regime is not the same thing as aiding and abetting its
alleged human rights abuses . . . It is not enough that a defendant provide
substantial assistance to a tortfeasor; the "substantial assistance" must also
"advance the [tort's] commission." . . . providing the Hussein regime with ñinds
— even substantial funds — does not aid and abet its human rights abuses if the
money did not advance the commission of the alleged human rights abuses.
Thus, the Court refused to make the broad assumption that all financial
support to a regime that commits gross human rights violations automatically
has a substantial effect on the violations carried out because it will at least free
up funds that can then be dedicated to that purpose. However, it did not require
that "the particular funds provided were used to commit the abuses, or that
without the funds the Hussein regime would not have been able to commit such
abuses, so long as the assistance is 'a substantial factor in causing the resulting
tort. "'364
This quote implies that, confrary to the view of the Court in South African
Apartheid Litigation^^^ the provision of funds to a regime can have a
sufficiently substantial effect on the violadons it carries out to frigger aiding and
abetting liability of the ftinder. Nevertheless, in Mastafa the claim was
ultimately rejected. The Court suggested that:
It is unnecessary to decide whether it would suffice, in the present ease, for
plaintiffs to allege facts that plausibly suggest that the $220 million m kickbacks
"substantially assisted" the regime to commit its human rights abuses by allowing
it to maintain power and fiinction as a minimally effective govemment, as
plaintiffs do not specifically allege facts in support of this proposition. Even if
AWB's payments to the Hussein regime did substantially assist in the
commission of human dghts abuses, plaintiffs fail adequately to allege that BNP
knew that the money it disbursed to AWB was being used to make sueh
360. Id at *2.
361. W. at*l .
362. Id. at *4.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. However, even though coming to a different eonclusion with regard to the question of
funding at 269, the eourt eited the above Mastafa statements with approval, see In re South African
Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
366. Mastafa, 2008 WL 4378443 at *4.
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payments.
Thus, the Court dismissed the claim because of insufficient factual
allegations to show substantial assistance, and also because the complaint did
not adequately establish that BNP had acted with the necessary mens rea. As a
consequence, the Court did not have to expand on the issue of precisely how it
can be shown that "the assistance is 'a substantial factor in causing the resulting
tort.'"368
The liability standard applied in Mastafa is very similar to the standard
goveming the proximate cause analysis in most decisions on funding terrorism.
This demonsfrates the standard's relevance beyond the terrorism context.
However, though courts require a showing of proximate cause in the terrorism
context, the terrorism cases ofren infer the substantial effect of frinding on
terrorist attacks where money was made available to the terrorist organization
that carried out the attacks at issue or front groups for that organization.^^^
Conversely, in the context of frinding provided to states, courts have
rejected this general inference, even where a state sponsor of terrorism receives
money directly. Such rejection is premised on the argument that govemments,
even those that are widely regarded as "state sponsors of terrorism," carry out a
wide range of legitimate functions.^^° Therefore, it is difficult to sustain that,
like FTOs, states are "so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution
to such an organization facilitates that conduct."^''' Consequently, where money
was provided to such states, eourts only applied the "freeing up of funds" theory
to causation if the funder violated sanction regimes or other regulations in place
to limit access to fiinds for other than humanitarian purposes.-'^^ These
prohibitions are based on, and put the lender on notice of, the assumption that all
funding made in violation of the regulations will be used, either directly or
indirectly, for the furtherance of terrorism. To automatically infer that all loans
made to a regime finance, or at least have a substantial impact on, the gross
human rights violations it carries out, instead of frinding legitimate state tasks,
would therefore be problematic.
Without simply inferring liabilify, it is not easy to establish the effect
financing has on human rights violations. Just as with other products or
transactions, the more directly a loan is linked to the violations committed by the
367. Id at *5.
368. Id.
369. See, e.g.. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 718 F. Supp. 2d 456, 492-93
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
370. 5ee, e.g., Abecassis v. Wyatt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 623, 644 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Abecassis v.
Wyatt, 785 F. Supp. 2d 614, 649 (S.D. Tex. 2011); Rothstein v. UBS AG, 772 F. Supp. 2d 511,516
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
371. Holder V. Humanitarian Uw Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010).
372. Abecassis, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 649; .see also, Rothstein, 772 F.Supp.2d at 516.
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borrowing regime, the easier it is to establish causation. •'^ ^ Where the violation
would not have taken place without the loan, the necessary link between a loan
and gross human rights violations committed by the bortower is clearly
established. However, as the contribution does not need to be a sine qua non of
the commission of these violations,^^'' such a showing is not required. It would
also be sufficient to establish that the violations would have taken place
differently,-'^ ^ for example with less intensity or over a shorter period of time.-'^ ^
A loan can make an important contribution to a gross human rights
violation whether or not the money lent to the regime is directly used to finance
this violation. It might, for example, indirectly facilitate the violation by adding
to the financial resources of the regime or by providing a stabilizing effect on
the political position of the regime.•'^^ The crucial question is how close the link
needs to be between the loan and the violation, and how significant the impact
of the loan, to conclude that the loan had a substantial effect on the violations
cartied out against the victims, thereby creating lender responsibility. Where the
loan had the direct purpose of financing the violations, for example where
money is provided for the purchase of arms to be used in exfra-judicial killings,
such a link seems obvious, but these cases will be rare. More relevant and much
more complicated are the situations in which a loan that is not directly linked to
the violations allows the regime to free up resources with which to buy the arms
necessary to carry out human rights abuses, or where loans stabilize a regime
that commits such violations, thereby intensifying and/or prolonging their
occurrence.
Bearing in mind the lesson from the cases on funding terrorism—that the
question of how to define the actus reus and proximate cause needs to be
approached with the consequences of the fungibility of money in mind^^^—it
should not be necessary to establish a link between the fund and the specific
373. See Adam McBeth, Holding the Purse Strings: The Continuing Evolution of Human Rights
Law and the Potential Liability of the Finance Industry for Human Rights Abuses, 23 NETH. Q.
HUM. RTS. 7,24-25 (2005).
374. In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(quoting Prosecutor v. Fumndzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Trial Chamber Judgment, 1] 209 (Dec. 10,
1998)).
375. Prosecutor v. Tadié, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 1| 688 (May 7, 1997)
("While there is no definition of "substantially", it is clear from the aforementioned cases that the
substantial contribution requirement calls for a contribution that in fact has an effect on the
commission of the crime. This is supported by the foregoing Niimberg cases v/here, in virtually
every situation, the criminal act most probably would not have occurred in the same way had not
someone acted in the role that the accused in fact assumed") (emphasis added) (quoted
inPresbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 324 (S.D.N.Y.
2003)); Almog v. Arab Bank PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 5ee also In re South
African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 257-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
376. For a discussion see Sabine Michalowski & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, supra note 5 at 77.
377. Id. at 75-77; ^ ee also Shaw W. Scott, supra note 4 at 1531 -32.
378. See supra Section IV(B).
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violation committed by the regime to which the ftinding was provided. This is
eomparable to the approach of the Court in South African Apartheid Litigation
with regard to the liability of the automotive and technologies defendants, where
no showing of a causal link between a particular military vehicle or customized
computer program and the violation suffered by the victim was required to
establish liability of the defendant automotive and technology companies.^^^
Indeed, such a showing would in most cases be impossible to make and to
require it would exclude liability in the vast majority of cases. Rather, it was
sufficient that the type of assistance provided could have had a substantial effect
on the violations that occurred.
It is admittedly more complicated to determine whether financial assistance
has a substantial effect on the commission of an offense than to determine the
effects of products that can be the direct means through which the violations are
carried out. The most convincing analysis of how to determine whether financial
assistance had a causal relationship with the crimes carried out by the recipient
of the money is that presented by Judge Rovner in his dissenting opinion in
Boim III?^^ When determining how to establish causation in the context of
funding allegedly made to Hamas, Rovner suggested that, given the dual
ftinctions of Hamas as terrorist organization and provider of social welfare
services, liability of someone making a financial donation to Hamas for the
terrorist attacks it carries out could not simply be inferred.^^' While no link
between a specific donation and the particular terrorist offense suffered by the
victim needed to be established, it was necessary to show at a minimum a causal
link between the support provided to Hamas and the organization's terrorist
activities.-'^^ This could be achieved by carrying out an analysis of all the
circumstances of each case in order to determine whether or not funding had a
379. In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 264-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
380. Boim V. Holy Land Found, for Relief and Dev't ("Boim III"), 549 F. 3d 685 (7th Cir.
2008).
381. Id, at 710. In support of his view. Judge Rovner relied heavily on the majority opinion in
Boim V. Holy Land Found, for Relief and Dev't ("Boim 11"), 511 F. 3d 707 (7th Cir. 2007) which he
himself delivered. There the court suggested that even though an assumption that financial support to
terrorist organizations might support their terrorist activities could be valid, "the plaintiffs still must
offer some proof that permits a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants'
conduct caused terrorist activity that included the shooting of David." Boim //, 511 F.3d at 741. The
court clarified that "the nature and significance of a defendant's action along with its chronological
relationship to the terrorist act that injured the plaintiff would be important considerations in
assessing whether the defendant caused the plaintiffs injury . . . the more significant the support
provided by a defendant, the more readily one might infer that support was a cause of later terrorist
acts." Boim II, 511 F.3d at 741-742. To the extent that plaintiffs rely on a "freeing up of funds"
theory, the eourt required a showing that "by providing funding to Hamas's other activities,
including the hospitals, schools, and other charitable missions that it sponsors, a donor frees up
Hamas resources for, or otherwise makes possible, Hamas's terrorist activities," thus refused to
impose liability "without some evidence of a causal link between a defendant's conduct and Boim's
murder." Boim //, 511 F.3d at 742.
382. 5o/m///, 549 F.3d at 710.
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causal effect on the terrorist acts carried out by the organization.^^-' Such an
assessment would require the expertise of someone "familiar with Hamas's
financial structure, or with the financing of terrorism generally. "^ "'^
This suggestion of a need for a detailed financial assessment seems feasible
for establishing a causal link between money made available to states and gross
human rights violations carried out by their govemments. In the context of
commercial loans, this might in fact be a more suitable liability criterion than in
the context of individual donations made to the charitable branches of a terrorist
organization. Banks have both the means and the expertise to consider the
impact and use made of sovereign loans.''
One way to put this into practice would be to apply a holistic analysis to the
relationship between financing and human rights. Antonio Cassese suggested
this in his report to the UN on the situation in Chile. ^ ^^  Although not written
with the purpose of developing criteria for complicity liability of financiers, this
report nevertheless addresses some of the issues that are of interest here.^^^
Cassese argues:
To assess the impact of... foreign economic assistance on human rights in Chile
it is necessary to consider how this assistance is used, what measures the recipient
Govemment takes in the area covered by the assistance, and, more generally,
what kind of economic and social policy it implements . . . All depends on the
way the recipient Govemment allocates its own resources, as well as on the
general context within which it utilizes the inflow of foreign resources.
Cassese concluded that "there arises a relationship in which economic
assistance often appears instmmental in perpetuating or at least maintaining the
current situation of gross violations of human rights"-'^^ because "the bulk of
this assistance helps to strengthen and maintain in power a system which
ptirsues a policy of large-scale violations of these rights."^^'^ Even where money
is made available for human rights related programs, "[o]ften, the Govemment
uses this assistance to replace national resources, which are diverted to other
383. Id
384. Id
385. For a discussion see, e.g.. Brief for Essex Transition al Justice Network et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Ibañez Manuel Leandro and others, Juzg. Fed. Civil y Comer;;ial Federal Juzg.
Fed., 95.019/2009, "Ibañez Manuel Leandro y otros casos c. Diligencia preliminar contra
instituciones financieras no determinadas," at 82-89, available at http://www.reports-and-
materials.org/Intl-banks-complicity-in-Argentina-Amicus-Curiae-Mar-2010.doc.
386. U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Prot.
of Minorities, Study of the Impact of Foreign Economic Aid and Assistance on Respect for Human
Rights in Chile, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/412 (July 20, 1978).
387. See also Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Mariana Rulli, supra note 4.
388. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/412 at 15.
389. Id at 24.
390. Id
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ends, including that of financing the repressive system."^^' Cassese also states:
[I]n some respects, the fiow of capital goods can help prop up the repressive
system, by making it eeonomically viable: in this way, the economic assistance
becomes instrumental in maintaining and prolonging in time disregard for civil
and politieal freedoms.
To perform an assessment of the economic and political context in which a
loan is granted and going to be used is not beyond the tasks that corporations are
in a position to carry out. Such evaluations form to some extent part of existing
due diligence expectations with regard to assessing the risks involved in banking
fransactions.-'^-' These general due diligence standards are complemented by the
emerging concept of human rights due diligence, the importance of which was
recently articulated by the special representative of the UN Secretary General
(SRSG) on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other
business enterprises, John Ruggie.^^'' The due diligence responsibilities
idendfied include avoiding complicity.-'^^ A report by the SRSG specifically
dedicated to questions of sphere of infiuence and complicity emphasized that as
part of its due diligence responsibilides in the context of avoiding complicify in
human rights violations:
[A] company needs to understand the traek records of those entities with whieh it
deals in order to assess whether it might contribute to or be associated with harm
391. Id
392. /i/. at 19-20.
393. These include, for example, the responsibility to Know Your Customer (KYC). This
responsibility has largely been developed in the context of money laundering. See, e.g.. Fin. Action
Task Force, FATF 40 Recommendations, Recommendation 5(d), at 5 (Oct. 2003) (suggesting in this
context that finaneial institutions should conduct "ongoing due diligence on the business relationship
and scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that the
transactions being eonducted are consistent with the institution's knowledge of the customer, their
business and risk profile, including, where neeessary, the source of funds"), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org; Customer Due Diligence for Banks (Basel Comm. on Banking
Supervision), Oct. 2001, at para. 4 (highlighting the importance of KYC beyond that context: "The
Basel Committee's approach to KYC is from a wider prudential, not just anti-money laundering,
perspective. Sound KYC procedures must be seen as a critical element in the effective management
of banking risks") and para. 43 ("even in the absence of such an explicit legal basis in criminal law,
it is clearly undesirable, unethical and incompatible with the fit and proper conduct of banking
operations to accept or maintain a business relationship if the bank knows or must assume that the
funds derive from corruption or misuse of public assets"), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs85.pdf See also Brief for Essex Transition al Justice Network et al. as
Amiei Curiae Supporting Ibañez Manuel Leandro, supra note 385 at 383-88, where these principles
are linked to eomplicity liability for financing gross human rights violations.
394. U.N. Speeial Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corp. and Other Bus. Enters., Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, Human Rights
Council, Principles 17 and 18, A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie).
395. Id. at Principle 17 ("Human rights due diligence: (a) Should cover adverse human rights
impacts that the business enterprise may cause or eontribute to through its own activities, or which
may be directly linked to iis operations, products or services by its business relationships"). See also
Commentary to Guiding Principle 17.
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caused by entities with which it conducts, or is considering conducting business
or other activities. This analysis of relationships will include looking at instances
where the eompany might be seen as eomplieit in abuse caused by others.
While the SRSG's framework deals with corporate human rights due diligence
more generally, calls for comprehensive human rights impact assessments in the
context of financing are also increasing,•'^^ manifesting a growing awareness of
the importance of the link between financing and human rights violations.
When considering the scope of due diligence in the context of sovereign
lending, a country's bad record with regard to human rights violations does not
put a govemment in the same position as a terrorist organization. Accordingly,
financing made available to it does not automatically result in complicity
liabilify of the lender. However, the country's record should put the lender on
notice that there is a heightened risk that its loans might directly or indirectly
facilitate such violations. Where a regime is widely known to commit gross
human rights violations, as was the case with South Africa under apartheid,-'^^ it
could be argued that lenders have a heightened due diligence obligation to
inquire into the use of the money they are lending with respect to the violations
taking place.'"^''
To determine whether or not a loan had a substantial effect on gross human
rights violations committed by a regime in a case such as South Africa under
apartheid, courts should assess the extent to which the regime depended on the
loans for financing the violations it carried out. This might include "whether the
loans had an effect on the military's budget and expenditures,"^"' or the extent
to which the country needed the loans to stay in power. For this, the amount lent
to the regime would be clearly important. The combination of the nature of the
396. UN. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corp. and Other Bus. Enters., Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Dev't, Clarifying the
Concepts of "Sphere of Influence" and "Complicity", 1| 22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/16 (May 15, 2008)
(by John Ruggie).
397. While this concept is mainly used in the context of project financing, see, e.g., EQUATOR
PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-principles.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2012), it is abo employed with
regard to other banking activities more generally, .see, e.g., Rita Roca & Francesca Manta, supra
note 335.
398. 5ee, e.g., Anita Ramasastry (1998), supra note 4; Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Veerle
Opgenhaffen, supra note 4; Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Mariana Rulli, supra note 4; Sabine
Michalowski & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, supra note 5; 5ee also Louis A. Pérez & Deborah M.
Weissman, Public Power and Private Purpose: Odious Debt and the Political Economy of
Hegemony, 32 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 699, 701 (2007).
399. Numerous UN resolutions expressed the intemational communify's condemnation of the
human rights situation. For an overview see First Amended Complaint at 93-115, In re South
African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 03 Civ. 4524).
400. For a diseussion of duties to investigate risks where companies have reason to believe that
'their products or services could be misused in order to perpetrate gross human rights abuses' see
Int'l Comm'n of Jurists, supra note I, Vol. 3 at 31 (2008).
401. Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Veerle Opgenhaffen, supra note 4 at 175.
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regime and the scale of the loan might give rise to a presumption that these loans
had a substantial impact on the policies and acts of that regime, including its
commission of gross human rights violations.'"*^
However, unlike in terrorism cases, lending to a regime that commits
massive human rights violations does not, in itself, give rise to liability.
Therefore, a defendant could rebut the presumption of liability if a thorough
assessment of the impact of the loan on the spending policy of the govemment
were to show that the money was used for legitimate govemment purposes. This
is, again, similar to the analysis that needs to be carried out with regard to other
types of assistance, such as the sale of military vehicles, where the nature of the
regime and that of the vehicle might give rise to the assumption that the vehicles
would be used for unlawful killings, but it must be open to the defendant
corporations to demonstrate that this was not the case.
A final question is to what extent liability can be based on the fact that
loans for beneficial purposes might free up funds that will then be used for other
purposes. While it is probable that this will be the case in many instances, this
should not be a sufficient basis for liability. The arguments developed in the
state sponsor of terrorism context are valid here. Sovereign lending is not
allowed, but there might be good reasons, such as humanitarian purposes, to
supply funding to such states. Indeed, as the discussions surrounding the refusal
to provide banking services in Gaza show, it might have human rights
implications or even give rise to liability not to provide such services where they
are essential to avoid a humanitarian crisis.'"*^
This addresses the criticism that corporate complicity liability under the
ATCA runs counter to the fact that, in many of the relevant cases, not only was
no policy of divestment pursued by the United States or other governments, but
govemmental policies actively encouraged engagement in the relevant
countries.'"*'* Simply doing business with such a state does not trigger complicity
liability. Instead, it should depend on a thorough case-by-case analysis of the
impact of the act of the corporation on gross human rights violations. Therefore,
corporations are free to engage constructively with regimes, even those that
commit gross human rights violations on a large scale, as long as they avoid any
complicity in these violations. Indeed, complicity liability in the context of
financing should not aim to or result in cutting off all states with dubious human
rights records from all foreign lending. Rather, it should seek to avoid lending
that substantially furthers the intemational law violations carried out by the
regime. This cannot conflict with constructive engagement, as there is nothing
402. Brief for Essex Transition al Justice Network et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Ibañez
Manuel Leandro, supra note 385 at 89; .see also Sabine Michalowski & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky,
supra note 5, at 84-85.
403. See Dana Weiss & Ronen Shamir, Corporate Accountability to Human Rights: The Case
of the Gaza Strip, 24 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 155 (2011).
404. In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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constmctive about complicity in human rights violations.^*'^  Conversely,
constmctive engagement cannot give corporations a blank check to be complicit
in gross human rights violations carried out by regimes with which they are
engaging.''*'^
Re-examining the case against the banks in South African Apartheid
Litigation in light of these considerations, the Court should not have rejected the
claims outright. Rather, it should have carried out a detailed analysis of the
impact the loans specified in the complaint had on the crimes that injured the
plaintiffs. While most of the allegations against the defendant banks do not refer
to the financing of particular crimes, such a relationship was not necessary. It
would have been sufficient to sho'w that some of the loans went to the security
forces, as long as it could be established that these loans had a significant impact
on the commission of afrocities by these forces.
The assertions that, without the ftinding provided by Barclays and UBS, the
apartheid regime could neither have maintained confrol over the civilian
population nor maintained and expanded its security forces to the same
degree^*'' would have required an application of the holistic approach discussed
above. Alleging that the defendant banks "directly financed the South African
security forces that carried out the most brutal aspects of apartheid,"''*^^ is not in
itself sufficient to show a substantial effect of the loans on the violations carried
out by the security forces, but could form the basis of an investigation into the
effects of the loans on these violations. In particular, asserting that the loans
"supported increased spending on intemal security, . . . [and] defense
expenditures due to the growing costs of policing the apartheid state"'**'^  would
have merited a further analysis of the impact, if any, the loans had on apartheid
crimes.
The liability standards suggested here present a challenge for courts
determining complicity liability in the context of financing. Indeed, many
specifics of the criteria delimiting liability need to be developed ftirther and
refined. However the difficulty of the task is not a reason to exempt from
liability those whose loans potentially had an effeet on the commission of gross
human rights violations or to deprive victims of a remedy, without any
investigation. Additionally, the complexity of the assessment needed to link a
405. Richard L. Herz, The Liberalising Effects of Tort: How Corporate Complicity Liability
Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 222
(2008).
406. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 298 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J.,
concurring) ("business imperatives [do not] require a license to assist in violations of intemational
law").
407. First Amended Complaint at 151, Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d
Cir. 2007) available at
http://www.hausfeldllp.com/content_documents/9/KhulumaniClassActionComplaLpdf.
408. / ¿ a t 152.
409. W. at 169.
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loan with violations suffered by victims is far from unusual in tort cases. Courts
must often conduct onerous investigations to determine liability'*"' or apply
creative approaches to liabilify to avoid unfair and undesirable results.'*' '
One result of the approach suggested in this Article is that the relevance of
the commercial or routine nattire of a transaction primarily comes to the fore in
the analysis of the mens rea. To adopt a more inclusive actus reus test might
have the consequence of shifting the distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate activities fiom the actus reus or causation element(s) to the mens rea
element in the context of complicity liability. This could lend support to current
attempts to adopt a more rigid mens rea standard and require that the accomplice
act with the purpose of bringing about the human rights violations,'*'^ as
opposed to attaching liability where the a donor or lender rendered assistance
with knowledge that the violations were likely to occur. '*'^  Indeed, it has been
observed in a different context that laxer actus reus standards are frequently
combined with tougher mens rea standards, and vice versa.'^^'^ For example, in
the recent Kiobel decision. Judge Levai, concurring, highlights that the often-
voiced worries of unlimited liability of corporations are unfounded as long as
the applicable mens rea standard is one of purpose rather than knowledge.'*'^
This implies, therefore, that these concems would be warranted if liabilify were
not kept within bounds by a rigid mens rea standard.
While a discussion of the mens rea is beyond the scope of this Article, it
should be noted that the less rigid mens rea standard of knowledge is both the
410. For example in the context of medical malpractice suits which might raise complex
causation issues that can only be determined with the help of various experts. See, e.g.. Manning v.
King's College Hospital NHS Trust, [2008] EWHC (QB) 1838. See also Sheeley v. Mem'l Hosp.,
710A.2d 161 (R.I. 1998).
411. For example, if the particular nature of a tortfeasor's contribution makes it difficult to
determine a causal link to the harm that arose, as happened in cases where a person suffered harm
because of exposure to asbestos in the course of his/her employment, but it could not be shown with
certainty which employer was responsible for the exposure that caused the illness, courts have
shown creativity and determined that it would be sufficient to show that on the balance of
probabilities, the act of the defendant materially increased the risk of a known source of harm to
which the claimant had been exposed. See, e.g., Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Servs. Ltd., [2002]
UKHL 22. For an application of this principle to the situation of funding gross human rights
violations, .see Brief for Essex Transition al Justice Network et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Ibaflez Manuel Ixandro, supra note 385 at 75.
412. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
413. Id. (rejecting what had been the accepted mens rea test in the context of ATCA litigation);
See, e.g.. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 950-51 (9th Cir. 2002); Cabello v. Femandez-Larios, 402 F.
3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 54
(E.D.N.Y. 2005); Almog v. Arab Bank PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
414. Albin Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in I THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 767, 801 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002);
Christoph Burchard, supra note 139 at 938.
415. K.iobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 158 (2d Cir. 2010) (Levai, J.,
concurring in judgment).
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standard widely recognized in intemational law'"^ and the appropriate standard
for policy reasons.'"^
416. See, e.g.. United States v. Von Weizsäcker ("The Ministries Case"), 14 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO.
10 [T.W.C.], at 622 (Nuemberg Military Tribs. 1950); U.N. War Crimes Comm'n,.LAW REP. OF
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS (Vol. 1), Case. No. 9, The Zyklon B Case, The Trial of Bruno Teseh
and Two Others, at 93-103 (1947) at 101; United States v. Flick ("The Fliek Casï"), 6 TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
NO. 10 [T.W.C.], at 1217 (Nuemberg Military Tribs. 1952); United States v. Krauch ("The I.G.
Farben Case"), 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 [T.W.C.], at 1169 (Nuemberg Military Tribs. 1953);
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 545 (Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. Bagilishema,
Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, 44-46 (June 7, 2001 ); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. :iT-95-17/1, Trial
Chamber Judgment, \ 245 (Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Vasiljevió, Case No. 1T-98-32-T, 71 (Nov.
29, 2002), aff'd. Case No. 1T-98-32-A, Appeals Judgment, 102 (Feb. 25, 2004); ^ee also Proseeutor
V. Aleksovski, Case No. 1T-95-14/1-A, 111| 162-63 (Mar. 24, 2000); Prosecutor v. Tadié, Case No. lT-
94-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 1| 678, 692 (May 7, 1997).
417. The recent decision in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) along with
the ATCA cases deeided prior to the Talisman deeision of 2009, e.g. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 and In re
"Agent Orange", 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 show that courts regard themselves as perfectly capable of
distinguishing aeeeptable business transactions from those that result in liability when the applicable
standard of mens rea is that of knowledge. For a discussion see also, for example, -\Vim Huisman &
Elies van Sliedregt, Rogue Traders: Dutch Businessmen, International Crimes, and Corporate
Complicity, 8 J. iNT. CRIMINAL JUSTICE. 803, 822-23 (2010).
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